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Abstract 
 
 The phenomenon of tax inversion has returned to the public eye as American companies 
in every sector explore expatriation as a means to avoid the highest corporate tax rate in the 
developed world. In response to billions of dollars in tax revenue flowing overseas, legislators 
have proposed dozens of laws over the past four decades aimed at curbing these transactions, but 
to no avail. In 2015 alone, tens of billions of dollars' worth of tax inversion transactions 
were announced. This thesis will analyze the motivations behind corporate emigration using both 
legal and economic framework, and will model this behavior using Probit analysis. We conclude 
that run rate tax differentials, rather than the distinction between worldwide and territorial 
systems, motivate corporate inversion. We suggest that a tax holiday would limit the short-term 
benefits of expatriation and provide time for a new administration to work with Congress to 
enact a competitive reduction in the corporate income tax rate. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 For decades, political and business leaders have voiced their displeasure with the 
American tax code. While the tax policies of the United States’ economic competitors have 
developed and evolved along with their economies, the tax system in the United States has 
remained out-of-touch, both in its content and complexity. The contents of its over 4 million 
words
1
 detail a system unique to the developed world that puts American firms at a disadvantage 
to their international competitors. Two key idiosyncrasies are that the United States employs a 
worldwide tax system, rather than the territorial approach found in almost every other major 
economy, and the United States has the third-highest corporate tax rate in the developed world
2
. 
In response, several companies domiciled in the United States have employed creative legal 
tactics to avoid what they consider an uncompetitive tax environment. 
 Economies around the world tax foreign earnings of domestic corporations using two 
main approaches. Most of the world uses a territorial tax system in which foreign earnings are 
taxed in their source location, and there is “…little or no associated tax obligation to the parent 
firm’s home country”3. This means, for example, that if a German subsidiary of a British 
company earns a profit, it will be either free or extremely cheap to repatriate those profits to the 
British parent company. The United States, however, is unique in that it employs a worldwide tax 
system in which “…the earnings of foreign subsidiaries are taxed in both the foreign jurisdiction 
                                                          
1 Wood (2014) explains that since 1913, the tax code has grown from 27 to 9,000 pages 
containing 4 million words. He adds, “from 2001-2002 alone, there were 4,600 changes, more 
than one a day” 
2 Pomerleau and Lundeen (2014) add that only Puerto Rico and the United Aram Emirates have 
tax rates higher than the 39.1% corporate income tax rate in the United States, which is 14.1 
percentage points higher than the OECD average 
3 Bird, Edwards and Shevlin (2015) 
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where they are earned, and in the multinational’s home country”4. This means that if those same 
German profits belonged to the subsidiary of an American, rather than British, parent company, 
they would be subject to the same German taxes, but also an additional American tax upon 
repatriation. In other words, a worldwide system entails double taxation of foreign earnings, 
while a territorial tax system taxes profits only at the source. As the Tax Foundation, a 
nonpartisan tax research group, states, “this (American) system allows corporations to compete 
internationally, but places a significant burden on corporations that want to reinvest income back 
into America”5.  
 As a result of this disadvantage, American companies are forced to make the decision of 
whether it is more beneficial to repatriate foreign earnings or simply leave those earnings 
offshore, classifying them as “locked-out earnings”, avoiding the repatriation tax. Consider a 
multinational presented with a domestic investment opportunity that will be financed by foreign 
profits. Presented with the exact same investment profile, that opportunity will have a lower net 
present value for an American firm than one of its competitors operating under a territorial 
system because it entails additional taxation to which international firms’ foreign profits are not 
subjected. Ultimately, this makes it less likely that American multinationals reinvest foreign 
profits in the United States, and in turn less likely for those companies to conduct research and 
create jobs in the U.S. A study conducted by Bloomberg using securities filings confirms this, 
concluding that as of the end of 2014, American companies held approximately $2.1 trillion 
overseas, a figure which at over 12% of 2014 gross domestic
6
 product reflects the significant 
                                                          
4 Bird, Edwards and Shevlin (2015) 
5 Pomerleau (2015) notes that “today there are only 6 countries that tax corporations on their 
worldwide income” 
6 World Bank data for 2014 United States Gross Domestic Product found at  
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incentive for American companies to avoid double taxation at the highest rate in the developed 
world
7
.  
 While it is common practice for U.S. multinationals to keep international profits offshore, 
a technique known as deferral
8
, an increasing number of companies are taking even more 
extreme measures to avoid taxes. A “tax inversion” is a technique by which an American 
company expatriates its tax headquarters through a complex legal maneuver, and since 1982 over 
75 formerly U.S. multinationals have reestablished their tax domiciles in a foreign country. The 
Committee on Ways and Means in the U.S. House of Representatives estimates that inversions 
will cost the government tens of billions of dollars in the coming years
9
, and consequentially this 
issue has reached the highest levels of debate.  
 The boardrooms of Fortune 500 companies do not have a responsibility to protect 
government coffers, though, and despite political backlash and name-calling, executives continue 
to look for ways to minimize their firms’ tax obligations. Some leaders have suggested that 
paying taxes is a patriotic duty, but boards of directors instead subscribe to the ideas of judicial 
philosopher Learned Hand, who in Commissioner v. Newman stated, “…there is nothing sinister 
in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; 
and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are 
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere 
cant”1011. Firms certainly do not voluntarily pay more taxes in the name of patriotism, so as 
                                                          
7 Rubin (2015) 
8 Surowiecki (2016) suggests that deferral causes “…the worst of both worlds. Since so much of 
what companies earn remains abroad and untaxable, we (the U.S.) raise only a small amount of 
revenue from our global system” 
9 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means (2016) 
10 Chirelstein (1986) 
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Learned Hand writes, companies using the law to reduce their tax bill are not acting unpatriotic, 
and should not be shamed for doing so. In this line of reasoning, if a firm identifies a strategic 
opportunity within the boundaries of the law to limit its tax burden without materially impacting 
business operations, it is well within its rights to do so. Similar to the way in which companies 
organize their distribution operations to maximize profits, firms organize their legal structure in 
the most efficient way possible. The key takeaway is that while some political leaders suggest 
that inversions exploit “loopholes”12 that let multinationals avoid paying their fair share, tax 
inversions are completely legal and have withstood countless legal battles. To the extent that 
these loopholes exist, it is elected officials’ collective responsibility to close them, and in fact, 
they are the only people with the legal power to do so.  
 
Arguments against Corporate Tax Inversion 
 Many legislators, though, rather than working to change the tax code that has made the 
United States less competitive than its international competitors, suggest that corporations in fact 
do have a patriotic duty to pay the high American corporate tax rate, which stands almost 15 
percentage points higher than the OECD average. This issue has risen to the highest levels of the 
American government, and has become so important that it’s reached the Oval Office.  
 In a summer 2014 weekly address, President Barack Obama finally brought the issue of 
tax inversions to the American public. During a tumultuous time both domestically and abroad, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Learned Hand is widely considered one of the greatest judges ever and “…was nicknamed the 
‘10th man on the U.S. Supreme Court’ because of his towering intellect and sterling reputation” 
according to Grondahl (2013)  
12 This excerpt is from the Clinton Campaign (2016), but both Democrats and Republicans have 
discussed tax inversions in almost every debate, frequently suggesting that companies are 
exploiting loopholes in the tax code; Donald Trump has been adamant in his stance that he 
does not blame these companies - he blames legislative incompetence - while most other 
candidates have faulted these companies for leaving the U.S. 
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tax policy and its implications took center stage. Describing the increasing popularity of tax 
inversion transactions, the President alerted the American public,  
“…There’s a trend that threatens to undermine the progress (the 
American people) have helped make. Even as corporate profits are as high 
as ever, a small but growing group of big corporations are fleeing the 
country to get out of paying taxes. They’re keeping most of their business 
inside the United States, but they’re basically renouncing their citizenship 
and declaring that they’re based somewhere else, just to avoid paying their 
fair share” - President Barack Obama, July 26, 2014 Weekly Address13  
 Tax inversions, which President Obama went on to describe in his address as 
“unpatriotic” and “totally wrong”, are a type of Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) transaction in 
which an American company purchases an international company, and in so doing structures 
itself as a subsidiary of a foreign parent company. The acquirer, which in a traditional M&A 
transaction would be the parent company of the newly acquired target, in effect flips, or inverts, 
its corporate structure so that it is no longer an American company, but an American subsidiary 
of the newly established international parent. After completion of these transactions, the firm’s 
physical headquarters often remains in the United States, its executives continue to operate in the 
United States, and by most measures the firm conducts itself in the exact same fashion as any 
other American company after a cross-border acquisition. The key difference that demands the 
American public’s attention is that for tax purposes, it now has a different address. Essentially, it 
is business as usual, except for a symbolic address change on a piece of paper that helps these 
multinational firms save millions, and in some cases, billions. 
                                                          
13 From the Remarks of President Obama (2014) published on the White House website 
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 The President claimed that firms have a patriotic duty to pay American taxes because 
they have benefited from the business environment in the United States for many years, and owe 
it to the American people to continue paying United States taxes. The idea is that after 
incorporating in the United States, as a firm grows it will benefit from the favorable American 
business climate. American property rights, its education system, infrastructure, regulatory 
environment and well-established capital markets are just a few of the distinctions that have 
made the United States the largest economy in the world and a fantastic environment for growth 
relative to the rest of the globe. Certainly, these benefits are the result of significant fiscal policy 
commitments, and at the same time, the country benefits as the growing company creates more 
jobs, transfers skills, and, of course, pays its own taxes. In this framework, the public and private 
sector have a mutually beneficial relationship: private companies use the American business 
environment as a growth catalyst, and the firms repay the country by paying their fair share of 
taxes as their bottom line continues to grow. 
Tax inversion, by this line of reasoning, represents a complete betrayal of the American 
public and the firm’s duty as a corporate citizen, and has earned some businesses that employ 
this strategy the distinction of “corporate deserter”14 from political figures such as Democratic 
Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton
15
. President Obama accuses these companies of taking 
advantage of the business environment in the United States to grow, and once it’s time to pay the 
country back as a major corporation, leaving town for a country with lower taxes. 
 
                                                          
14 Gleckman (2014) 
15 Hillary Clinton’s campaign website states, “these corporations benefit from access to the 
most talented workforce in the world, billions of dollars in public investment in basic research, 
and the robust American legal system, yet trade their U.S. identity to avoid paying their fair 
share.” 
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Considerations about the Troubling Trend behind Inversions 
Lost in the debate about the ethics of inversion is a troubling trend that threatens the very 
foundation of the United States economy. Boardrooms that used to debate in which American 
city to build a new factory are now debating to which foreign country they should relocate their 
headquarters. Rather than invest domestically, Fortune 500 companies are spending hundreds of 
millions of dollars on advice from lawyers and bankers on the most efficient way to leave the 
country. Business leaders in every sector have decided that the United States no longer 
represents a competitive economic environment, and are instead relocating from the country 
once considered to have the best economic opportunity in the world. It is important to note, 
though, that the estimate of a $20 billion loss over the next decade
16
 is a rounding error in a 
multi-trillion dollar federal budget. The real threat that arises from tax inversions is the 
increasingly prevalent sentiment that the United States no longer represents an attractive country 
to conduct business. As a 2015 study of tax systems concluded, “as the economic differences 
between the United States and other countries narrow, the ability of the United States to sustain 
U.S. exceptionalism will also decline”17. 
In a clear recognition of the increasingly competitive international tax environment, 
America’s economic competitors are evolving their tax code, in the process exacerbating the 
adverse impact of Congressional inaction. In the past decade, major trade partners such as the 
United Kingdom and Japan have shifted to modified versions of territorial tax systems, and 
economies like Ireland have entire divisions of their federal government dedicated to wooing 
                                                          
16 This estimate used by Walker (2014) comes from “a nonpartisan congressional research 
panel (that) said the U.S. would receive an additional $19.46 billion over a decade if most new 
tax inversions were essentially halted with proposed changes to the tax code” 
17 Surowiecki (2016) cites that capital is more mobile, the rest of the world has caught up to 
U.S. shareholder laws, and the U.S. is no longer such a huge part of the world economy 
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American companies. While other factors such as wages and trade agreements also incentivize 
companies to relocate their domiciles, these policy changes suggest that the entire international 
community is capitalizing on the uncompetitive business environment in the United States.  
Due to the tremendous advancements in technology that enable colleagues to stay 
connected all over the globe, the economic landscape is such that it really doesn’t matter where a 
multinational firm is headquartered. Barriers to cross-border capital flow continue to fall, and the 
modern multinational firm treats the entire globe as its headquarters rather than only the country 
in which it incorporated. The confluence of these dynamics means that the advantages of 
incorporating in the United States are diminishing. 
With this in mind, and understanding that these trends are extremely unlikely to reverse, 
this means that the incentive for American companies to invert will be present for at least the 
near term. Perhaps due to tax incentives, companies are buying targets that they would not 
normally consider simply because it enables inversion. While the tax benefits to inversion are 
significant, hundreds of millions of dollars on a run rate basis in some cases, they may not offset 
the significant risks inherent in any M&A activity, namely, execution and integration risk. An 
interesting topic, then, is the extent to which targets in tax inversions differ from targets in 
traditional cross-border M&A transactions with an American acquirer. 
This analysis compares tax inversion with traditional cross-border M&A in an effort to 
discern if tax benefits, rather than traditional strategic factors, motivate these transactions. Tax 
inversions, particularly in their current form as part of acquisitions, are a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the field of corporate finance, and there exists a significant opportunity for new 
research. Previous studies have focused on inbound acquisitions and the impact of the level of 
13 
 
locked-out earnings on M&A, but this analysis is unique in that it focuses on corporate tax rate 
differentials and their impact on outbound acquisition. 
The following section will provide a review of existing literature on tax inversions and 
merger motivation, and Section 3 will detail the birth and evolution of tax inversions. Section 4 
considers the Net Present Value (NPV) rule in the context of tax inversion and introduces the 
idea of “inversion elasticity”. Section 5 offers parallels between the leveraged buyout wave of 
the 1980s and the increasing number of tax inversions over the past decade, and explains that 
both can be understood using a similar framework. Econometric analysis begins in Section 6 
which details the various hypotheses and methods of data collection, and Section 7 defines the 
variables. Interpretation of the model is considered in Section 8, and Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
 There exists a substantial literature base discussing the extent to which taxes impact 
corporate behavior; however, tax inversion literature is still in its early stages, largely because 
the technique is relatively new in the field of corporate finance, and because the structure of tax 
inversion has evolved in response to several decades of legislation. After several rounds of 
legislation followed by creativity from lawyers and bankers, the modern corporate inversion is 
when an American company acquires or merges with a foreign company, and in the process 
adopts a new domicile in a new low-tax country. The modern inversion will be the focus of this 
thesis, and existing literature offers a foundation on which to build. While the following papers 
and articles do not explicitly address the modern inversion, they offer methodologies for 
understanding M&A behavior and research suggesting that the motivations for inversion are both 
present and significant. 
Much of the previous research has been focused on the impact of locked-out earnings on 
acquisition behavior. Because the United States tax code includes a tax on foreign earnings upon 
repatriation, many American companies choose to permanently keep cash overseas, called 
“locked-out” earnings, to avoid further taxation using a provision in the tax code called 
“deferral”. Bird, Edwards and Shelvin (2015) find an economically significant relationship 
between the amount of locked-out earnings an American company has and the likelihood that a 
foreign firm acquires it. Using a Probit model and a measure of the reported permanently 
reinvested earnings as a proxy for locked-out earnings, the authors conclude that American 
acquirers are at a disadvantage to foreign acquirers when pursuing an American target. Certainly 
this conclusion follows expectations; firms in economies with lower tax rates will value 
American targets higher than domestic acquirers because they will have access to more of the 
15 
 
target’s capital after the transaction, and thus will offer a higher price for the rights to that capital 
base. In effect, the American tax code makes American acquisitions less valuable because 
domestic buyers will realize lower after-tax cash flow than an international buyer. The United 
States’ high corporate tax rate of 35% paired with its unique worldwide, as opposed to territorial, 
tax system combine to make it very difficult for American companies to compete with foreign 
bidders. 
According to an empirical study conducted by Feld et al. (2013), this dynamic is also at 
play in the context of outbound cross-border acquisitions. The authors compare the number of 
outbound M&A transactions in Japan and the United Kingdom before each economy switched 
from an international to a territorial tax system in 2009 with the number of outbound transactions 
after the switch, and estimate that Japanese acquisitions abroad increased by 31.9%, while 
outbound acquisitions executed by firms domiciled in the United Kingdom increased by only 
3.9%. In other words, the switch from a worldwide to territorial system increased outbound 
acquisitions significantly. The authors explain the difference in the level of the policy change’s 
impact by stating that “the economic importance of this effect depends on the level of the 
domestic profit tax rate in place”18. In this situation, Japan’s tax rate was 40.9%, more than 10% 
higher than the United Kingdom’s, explaining the difference in magnitude. The statistically 
significant increase in investment activity indicates that firms have the appetite for investment, 
but are hesitant due to uncompetitive tax regimes. Building off of this conclusion, this means that 
American firms are not pursuing as much outbound investment as they would because of the 
United States tax code. The authors claim that a similar policy reform in the United States would 
increase outbound acquisitions by slightly over 17%. 
                                                          
18 Excerpt from the “Non-Technical Summary” section of the paper 
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 Given that American firms are less inclined to engage in outbound M&A due to the 
repatriation tax, it is possible that the repatriation tax also has an adverse effect on the outbound 
M&A that does take place. Certainly, as companies hold more cash overseas to avoid the high 
cost of repatriation, they need to find ways to put that money to work. Edwards et al. (2014) 
demonstrate that the current U.S. tax code, through its incentives to keep cash offshore, causes 
firms to use these funds for less profitable acquisitions. In other words, locked-out foreign 
earnings “burns a hole” in multinational corporations’ pockets, and they invest that cash in less 
attractive targets. Considering the execution and integration risk inherent in any M&A activity, 
this is a surprising, but perhaps logical conclusion. Rather than incur a cash drag on returns by 
pursuing no M&A at all, companies would rather purchase less-attractive firms. This means that 
the American tax system forces multinationals based in the United States to pursue less attractive 
investment opportunities abroad rather than bring that money back to the U.S. and invest in their 
home economy.  
 A key aspect of the authors’ analysis focused on the extent to which this relationship 
existed during the brief tax holiday, an aspect of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 that 
“…allowed firms to repatriate earnings previously designated as permanently reinvested earnings 
at a temporarily decreased tax rate of 5.25 percent (from 35 percent)”19. Their conclusion offered 
further proof that the repatriation tax stifles outbound M&A, and is a disadvantage to American 
companies, as the authors did not observe a significant negative relationship between the amount 
of locked out earnings and acquisition profitability. This means that when the repatriation tax 
was cut by 30 percentage points, firms were able to pursue more profitable acquisitions. In this 
instance, it is reasonable to conclude that the tax holiday was responsible for the sudden increase 
                                                          
19 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
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in frequency of profitable investments by U.S. multinationals, but tax inversions also exhibit 
periods of increased frequency followed by periods of inactivity
20
. 
Stearns and Allan (1996) suggest that periods of high merger activity can be broken down 
using the idea of “waves”, or a herd mentality. Using the leveraged buyout wave inspired by 
pioneers at the private equity firm KKR during the 1980s, the authors illustrate the phenomenon 
of a new technique taking the corporate world by storm and motivating leadership to pursue new 
strategy. The authors identify challengers, who are the most likely to exploit new economic and 
political conditions as a means to grow and profit, and members, top corporations and financial 
institutions that control the institutional economic system. According to their theory, challengers 
take advantage of simultaneous economic and political changes first, and after letting the 
challengers test the political and capital markets landscape, the members decide to act. Abrupt 
changes in the institutional setting eventually result in the end of merger waves. Section 5 offers 
an updated application of this theory to the tax inversion wave that has occurred over the last five 
years, highlighting parallels between this wave and the LBO wave of the 1980s.  
Certainly, in any merger or acquisition, the acquirer views the target as valuable in some 
way and worth pursuing. Harris et al. (1982) characterize two schools of thought describing 
merger activity. The first theory uses capital market valuations of corporations to shed light on 
their attractiveness as a target, suggesting that the acquirer believes they will successfully realize 
more value than the target’s current capital market valuation. The second school uses managerial 
actions, not necessarily motivated by capital markets, to explain acquisition behavior. For 
example, a manager looking to create an empire may engage in an acquisition that increases 
market share, but will not necessarily be profitable. These are of course two very specific schools 
                                                          
20 Bloomberg News (2015) 
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of thought, and many mergers are no doubt motivated by a combination of these factors. After a 
careful review of prior literature, the authors conclude that a consistent view of important 
characteristics that make certain firms merger targets does not exist. 
In their paper, Harris et al. use empirical analysis to discern what measureable factors 
make certain firms takeover targets while others are not. Using a sample of firms from the 1970s 
consisting of the same proportion of acquired vs. non-acquired firms as the whole economy, the 
authors conduct a Probit analysis in an effort to determine which, if any, financial and product 
market variables impact whether a firm was acquired or not. The authors reach a perhaps 
expected conclusion that at different times, different characteristics matter. While firms with low 
price to earnings ratios and smaller firms are more likely to be acquired during any time period, 
other financial variables play roles in certain time periods. For example, during the LBO boom, 
low debt levels made firms more attractive, likely because there was more room to use leverage 
in the acquisition in hopes of increasing returns to equity investors. 
While interesting, these results are far from complete. As the authors note, “perhaps most 
crucial is the realization that a merger is a combination of two separate entities”21. With this in 
mind, not only is the acquirer assessing the target, but investors in the target must determine 
what constitutes an acceptable offer. Still, though, this analysis provides an interesting model to 
use in the context of tax inversion transactions. Because tax inversions have been taking place 
for several years, analysis can include the cyclicality of control variables such as liquidity, 
capital structure and size, but it will be interesting to discern if tax rate differentials are 
statistically significant across the entire sample. Using this framework, it will be possible to learn 
whether inversion motivates the transactions or if inversion is simply “the icing on the cake”. 
                                                          
21 Harris et al. (1982) p. 183 
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One such inversion that has garnered public attention, and frankly public consternation, is 
Burger King’s 2014 acquisition of Tim Hortons, a Canadian coffee chain, and the consequential 
relocation of its corporate address to Canada. In the realm of “Americana”, it is difficult to find 
anything more iconic than a hamburger, and the American press did not view the transaction 
favorably, suggesting that tax savings motivated the deal. In a 2015 case study, Chris Capurso 
uses this transaction as a mechanism to discuss the phenomenon of a tax inversion, with a focus 
on tax policy. Specifically, he identifies the verbiage ambiguity in the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004, and suggests that its focus on physical location misses the true purpose of tax 
inversions, namely, that companies change their tax domicile - not their physical domicile. 
Additionally, Capurso highlights the Treasury Department regulations announced in 
September of 2014, which were aimed at eliminating “hopscotch loans”, or loans between 
foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. company, and language that made it more difficult for American 
companies to shrink in size prior to announcing the transaction in order to qualify for inversion. 
While both of these are necessary and relevant measures to deter corporate expatriation, it is 
important to note that these measures have not been effective in stopping these types of 
transactions, as 2015 saw 6 completed inversions and another 4 announced that are pending
22
. 
Interestingly, though, similar to government announcements in the early 2000s, Obama and 
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew have announced that further action is coming, and may be 
retroactive. Capurso also offers his own hybrid proposal to solve the tax inversion issue, but as I 
will discuss in later sections, this solution would not be effective. 
While Capurso provides an excellent foundation on which to build policy analysis, 
Auerbach and Reishus (1988) provide perhaps the most thorough and effective analysis of the 
                                                          
22 Bloomberg News (2015) 
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role taxation plays in merger decisions. The authors conclude that the only two potential tax 
benefits that have some impact on merger activity are the extent to which tax losses and credits 
are used by the acquiring company to offset the taxable income of target firms, and the ability to 
increase an asset base, and thus, depreciation, without paying a capital gains tax. They included 
other tax variables in their analysis, but ultimately concluded that the potential increase in 
interest deductions due to higher debt levels and tax losses and credits in the target firm are not 
significant. These conclusions are hardly convincing, but at the time in which this study was 
conducted, there had only been one completed tax inversion, and for the next several years tax 
inversions took place by restructuring one firm’s organization rather than as part of a cross-
border M&A transaction. 
This introduces the clear opportunity to build on this model, using the difference in tax 
rates and tax systems in international, rather than domestic, mergers to explain corporate investor 
behavior. The authors use similar nontax control variables, specifically, industry, valuation, and 
size. These are all effective and certainly include relevant variables in the context of merger 
decisions, but due to the fact that this study takes place over several years, it is important to 
control for economic conditions, as merger activity is extremely cyclical. Auerbach and 
Reishus’s work will provide an important foundation on which to build.  
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Professor and Director of the International Tax Program at the 
University of Michigan Law School, over the past several years has offered expert interpretation 
of previous legislation aimed at curbing corporate inversions. In his 2002 paper titled “For 
Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions”, the author explains that the increased 
frequency and size of inversions in the late 1990s and early 2000s “…involves the increased 
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market acceptance of the transaction”23. After citing the sizable post inversion savings, $400 
million in the case of Tyco International, Avi-Yonah (2002) suggests that it took so long for 
other companies to follow suit because the capital markets landscape was still uncertain, and 
companies first wanted to see how investors would welcome this maneuver, but once it became 
clear that “…there were no market downsides to inversion” many other companies used the 
technique, and legislators introduced several bills aimed at curbing inversion activity. 
Avi-Yonah maintains that any proposal must account for corporate residence in a 
meaningful and legitimate way, but it may be possible that “…technological developments have 
reduced corporate residence to meaningless”. In his critique of the six proposed Congressional 
bills at the time of writing, he suggests that “…the focus on ‘substantial business activities’ in 
the foreign jurisdiction is likely to lead to endless arguments about what is substantial enough”. 
He also goes on to explain that public shareholder composition is not necessarily related to what 
makes a multinational firm U.S.-based, and even if it did, the fluid nature of public markets 
means that the composition changes by the second, making it nearly impossible to use this metric 
as a definition for corporate residence. 
In a 2015 continuation of his legal approach to tax inversion research, Avi-Yonah 
identifies three main drivers of inversions, and suggests that the Treasury’s November 2015 
proposal fails to adequately address these motivations, and is “…unlikely to stem the tide”. He 
states that the first merger wave was driven by motivation “…to avoid Subpart F restrictions on 
the receipt of passive income and base company income”24, which is the practice of using 
deferral to avoid double taxation
25
. As an inverted company, the new entity would no longer 
                                                          
23 p. 1794 
24 Avi-Yonah (2015) p. 2 
25 Internal Revenue Service Subpart F 
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have the incentive to use the deferral clause to avoid repatriation tax because the repatriation tax 
would no longer exist. Additionally, Avi-Yonah states, the “…new foreign parent could engage 
in earning stripping transactions with old US parent”26, further limiting tax liabilities and 
increasing cash flow. He maintains that both of these benefits have been present throughout the 
history of tax inversions, but that in the most recent wave a technique called “hopscotch” loans 
surfaced as an additional motivation. These loans are structured as a loan to the new foreign 
parent, avoiding the repatriation tax, as a means to distribute dividends or return cash to 
shareholders without high tax consequences. 
Citing the fact that most of Perrigo’s (a pharmaceutical company that inverted to Ireland) 
income is in the United States and the fact that companies with huge amounts of locked-out 
earnings, such as Apple, Google and Amazon, are not inverting, Avi-Yonah suggests that 
hopscotch transactions are not a key motivation. After all, Notice 2014-52 addressed this issue, 
and tax inversions are still taking place with increasing frequency. His contention is that “…the 
main driver for most inversions…is earnings stripping”27, essentially treating American profits as 
loans to the foreign parent company that are not subjected to the 35% tax rate. This is an 
important motivation for the econometric analysis that is detailed in Section 6; rather than use 
locked-out earnings as the motivation for inversion, the difference in tax rates between the target 
country and the United States is considered. Avi-Yonah’s research provides a legal and 
theoretical framework with which to understand the motivations behind tax inversion, and the 
quantitative analysis in this piece will offer econometric support to this hypothesis. 
In its continuing effort to inform public debate, Marples and Gravelle of the 
Congressional Research Service published a report (2015) outlining the extent to which proposed 
                                                          
26 Avi-Yonah (2015) p. 2 
27 Avi-Yonah (2015) p. 3 
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legislation has impacted the so-called “second wave” of tax inversions since the financial crisis. 
The authors contend that there are two distinct policy options that have been offered in response 
to the most recent wave; one is an overhaul of the entire United States tax code, and the other is 
specific legislation aimed at curbing tax-motivated cross-border M&A. With respect to changing 
the entire tax system, the authors suggest that it would be difficult to reduce the corporate tax 
rate enough to limit inversions, and shifting from a worldwide to a territorial tax system 
“…could worsen the profit-shifting that already exists among multinational firms”28. The latter 
argument, though, is somewhat lacking. The authors raise theoretical arguments as to why 
shifting to a territorial system might be an issue, but fail to highlight the arguments as to why it 
may be a net positive for the U.S. economy.  
The following section offers a brief history of tax inversion, explains the legislation that 
caused the structure of inversions to change over the past three decades, and provides analysis of 
the potential effectiveness of legislation currently in Congress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Excerpt from the Summary section 
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III. History of Tax Inversions 
Pre-Crisis Tax Inversions 
 Despite the relatively short history of corporate expatriation, there have been several 
different forms of tax inversion since McDermott International, a construction and engineering 
company based out of New Orleans, first flipped its corporate structure to become a Panamanian 
firm in 1982
29
. High oil prices during the stagflation of the late 1970s helped the firm earn 
massive contracts to manufacture offshore drilling equipment serving the oil and gas industry 
around the entire world. So high were their international profits that they were actually 
problematic; internal estimates concluded that bringing those profits back to the U.S. parent 
company would cost approximately $220 million. Because so much of McDermott’s business 
was based on building and designing drilling machinery outside of the U.S., bringing foreign-
earned profits back to the American parent company was a particularly expensive and 
consequential endeavor. 
 McDermott’s tax director decided to reach out to the firm’s lawyers at the famous New 
York firm Davis Polk & Wardwell to see if there was any maneuver that could enable the 
company to avoid paying such a heavy fee to simply move profits from offshore accounts to the 
American parent. Using every ounce of creativity and an extremely thorough understanding of 
international tax law and the U.S. tax code, they finally decided to pursue what would eventually 
be coined the “Panama Scoot”. McDermott announced the first corporate inversion in late 1982, 
engaging in a transaction “…in which its Panamanian subsidiary would acquire the American 
parent company, in effect making the Panamanian company the parent form and the American 
company one of its subsidiaries”30. This was a brand new approach to tax-efficient multinational 
                                                          
29 Skadden Client Presentation (2015) 
30 Hines (1991) p. 463 
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structuring, and as Bloomberg reporter Zachary Mider writes, it was “…like a daughter legally 
adopting her own mother…”31.  
 Using this brand new technique, the firm was able to circumvent Subpart F of the United 
States tax code, which for so many years made it expensive for multinational firms to repatriate 
foreign profits. Describing methods of operation for U.S. multinationals, the Internal Revenue 
Service states that “one type of entity through which foreign operations may be conducted is a 
foreign corporation”32. Prior to inversion, McDermott International used its Panamanian 
subsidiary as the parent corporation for its entire international operations. That is, it decided to 
funnel all of its foreign profits into the Panamanian corporation before repatriation to the 
ultimate United States parent; the IRS describes this technique, explaining, “a major tax 
advantage of using a foreign corporation to conduct foreign operations is income tax deferral: 
generally, U.S. tax on the income of a foreign corporation is deferred until the income is 
distributed as a dividend or otherwise repatriated by the foreign corporation to its U.S. 
shareholders”33. 
 Congress eventually ruled that this type of deferral was unfair because U.S. taxpayers 
attempted to shift as much profit as possible to these foreign corporations in low-tax areas. In 
response, Subpart F was enacted, eliminating the opportunity to defer certain types of income 
and “…treating a U.S. shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) as if it actually 
received its proportionate share of certain categories of the corporation’s current earnings and 
profits”34. With so much foreign-based income accruing, McDermott’s tax inversion seemed to 
                                                          
31 Mider (2014)  
32 Internal Revenue Service Subpart F Overview Slides 
33 id 
34 While eliminating this practice certainly makes it more difficult for multinationals to avoid 
paying U.S. taxes, it also means that the Internal Revenue Code in a sense ignores fiscal 
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be an ideal solution; rather than the Panamanian company being subjected to Subpart F as a CFC 
of the American parent company, the American company became a CFC of the Panamanian 
parent. Post inversion, McDermott operated in a more favorable international tax environment 
because “Panama’s corporate tax operates on a territorial basis, so it excludes from taxation the 
foreign (non-Panama) earnings of its resident corporations” (Hines 1991). This brand new 
technique would take the debate on international tax regimes by storm, and it seemed as if 
McDermott had struck a gold mine. As Charles Kraus, McDermott’s former tax director, stated 
in an interview with Mider, “there was a loophole in the law, and we capitalized on it 
legitimately”35 (Mider 2014).  
 Adding fuel to the fire that immediately followed was the fact that McDermott didn’t 
even pretend that there were strategic reasons for restructuring their business – it was a tax play 
all the way. In its 1982 deal prospectus, the firm explained that “the principal purpose of the 
reorganization is to enable the McDermott Group to retain, reinvest and redeploy earnings from 
operations outside the United States without subjecting such earnings to United States income 
tax”. Where nowadays companies at least use terms like “structural synergy” or “organizational 
improvements” to avoid the appearance of financial engineering, McDermott was explicit in its 
reasoning. The firm even went on to say that because Panama was a less stable political and 
social climate than the United States, the firm “…will not have any significant assets located in 
Panama”36. The company was almost asking for the lengthy legal battle that ensued. 
 Almost immediately following McDermott’s announcement, the Tax Court purported to 
claim that while the cash transaction was permissible, the exchange of shares between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sovereignty and claims taxation rights to all profits, regardless of where they were earned (from 
Subpart F Overview Slides) 
35 This certainly evokes Learned Hand’s philosophy from decades earlier 
36 Harris 1991 p. 464 
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Panamanian subsidiary and American parent company did not constitute assets as defined in 
Section 368
37
, and therefore did not constitute a legal acquisition. Presented with this brand new 
transaction structure, “the Tax Court conceded that the issue was before it ‘for the first time’ and 
that ‘commentators are split on the issue’”38. That this was an entirely new phenomenon and the 
court’s decision would set an historical precedent offers an explanation as to why it took a seven-
year legal battle with the IRS to finally ratify the transaction. In 1989, the first corporate 
inversion was finally ratified as legal, and the “…transaction was tax-free to the corporation”39. 
  The corporate world was stunned that McDermott was able to drastically shrink its tax 
bill simply by using an existing international subsidiary to buy the American parent company, 
and surely boardrooms in every sector studied the maneuver to see if it was possible to copy it. 
Fearing mass corporate exodus and a sudden erosion of tax revenues, the IRS amended Section 
1248, which “…was originally enacted as an anti-avoidance measure as part of Subpart F”40 with 
subsection (i). Section 1248(i) represents the first government response to tax inversion, and 
redefined the nature of inversions; henceforth, the law would assume that the American parent 
company already owned all of the stock of its international subsidiaries and that the stock was 
already transferred to shareholders of the parent company, and forced the parent “…to recognize 
and pay taxes on dividend income with respect to the previously untaxed earnings and profits of 
(the foreign subsidiary)”41. While this would put a stop to McDermott-like tax inversions, the 
floodgates certainly had opened. 
                                                          
37 https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-00-5.pdf 
38 Bhada v. Commissioner Internal Revenue Service (1989) 
39 Hwang (2015) p. 824 
40  Fenwick & West (2013) p. 3 
41 Hwang (2015) p. 823 
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 Section 1248(i) and extremely negative press releases conspired to halt corporate 
inversions for a decade
42
, but in 1994, a consumer products company called Helen of Troy, 
formerly of El Paso, Texas, took center stage. Section 1248(i) eliminated the tax-free nature of 
inversions by taxing a CFC’s profits as if they were dividends to the parent company, essentially 
eliminating the tax benefits to the transaction, so in response, Helen of Troy “…set up a brand 
new non-CFC corporation that had no earnings and no profits”43.  That Helen of Troy’s newly 
created Bermudan subsidiary had no profits meant that there wouldn’t be any taxes levied on the 
transaction; Section 1248(i) mandated taxes on the stock exchange, but since the American 
parent was exchanging stock with a brand new Bermudan non-CFC that had no profits to tax, the 
transaction was effectively tax-free. This creative structure sidestepped 1248(i), and again, the 
firm did not mince words about its motivation for expatriation as evidenced by the transaction 
prospectus, which stated that Helen of Troy’s new structure enabled “…greater flexibility in 
structuring its international business activities to minimize its non-U.S. income taxes”44. It is 
difficult to overestimate the threat that this inversion posed; the Bermudan
45
 subsidiary used to 
facilitate the transaction was brand new, introducing the potential that any American company 
can choose any country in the world, create a brand new non-CFC subsidiary, and relocate its tax 
domicile just as Helen of Troy had done. Certainly, the IRS and Treasury needed to act quickly 
to prevent a mass exodus of American businesses. 
 Echoing the same haste and frustration that existed after McDermott’s departure, the U.S. 
government quickly responded to this creative structure with an amendment to Section 367(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which details the treatment of outbound transfers of property 
                                                          
42 Wood (2014) 
43 Hwang (2015) p. 824 
44 id  
45 The corporate tax rate in Bermuda is 0%, certainly qualifying the country as a tax haven 
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to a foreign corporation, and specifically “…nonrecognition transactions such as capital 
contributions, corporate liquidations, and reorganizations”46. Under the law at the time of 
transaction, Helen of Troy’s inversion was not taxable to U.S. shareholders, so to prevent further 
tax-motivated reorganizations, the IRS issued Notice 94-46, providing “…that the transfer of 
stock or securities of a domestic corporation by a U.S. person to a foreign corporation is taxable 
if all U.S. transferors own in the aggregate 50 percent or more … of the transferee corporation 
immediately after the exchange”47. This regulation served to limit the benefits of inversion, and 
also proved that the IRS had the power to act swiftly to curb any perceived unfair activity in the 
early days of corporate expatriation.  
 The first true wave of tax inversions followed Helen of Troy’s lead during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, likely due to the confluence of several dynamics including the stock price crash, 
which greatly diminished or even eliminated capital gains taxes, pressure on managers to find a 
way to increase value, and the fact that lawyers and bankers continued to innovate new ways to 
provide a competitive advantage for their corporate clients
4849
.  
 It is crucial to use a wide lens to understand the aggregate impact of a tax inversion on 
the United States. Increased earnings stripping after inversion reduced American tax liabilities
50
, 
and certainly the transition to an ex-U.S. territorial system eliminated American tax liabilities on 
ex-U.S. profits. Residual U.S. profits were still subjected to American taxes post-inversion, and 
it is possible that after freeing up offshore cash and operating under a lower tax rate, the inverted 
                                                          
46 Internal Revenue Code Part 367 Overview 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/int_practice_units/ISO9411_08_01.pdf 
47 Herzfeld (2014) 
48 Hwang (2015)  
49 As later chapters will discuss, law firms and investment banks have earned hundreds of 
millions advising on tax inversions 
50 Treasury (2007) 
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company will pursue new investment opportunities in the United States that were previously 
unprofitable. Even if the company employs earnings-stripping to reduce the income of these new 
projects, this new investment will have a positive growth effect on the relatively highly-skilled 
and wealthy American economy
51
. Continued Congressional opposition suggests, however, that 
the negative impacts of inversion outweighed these potential benefits as legislators introduced 
wide-sweeping regulation in the early 2000s that served to temporarily halt inversions. 
 After several years of posturing and governmental warnings that inverters would be 
punished, Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) that added Section 
7874 to the IRC in an attempt to finally close the door through which dozens of American 
companies had left. Section 7874 specifically addressed the fact that despite renouncing their 
corporate citizenship, inverted firms still operate the same way they did when they were based 
out of the United States. To combat the superficial nature of these firms being characterized as 
international, Section 7874 instead classifies these businesses as “surrogate foreign corporations” 
if one of three conditions are met: shareholders of the domestic corporation hold at least 80% of 
the new international business, the new company does not have a substantial business presence 
in its new domicile, or the new foreign entity acquires substantially all of the American 
business
52
. If one of these conditions were met, then the firm would be taxed in the same way as 
a domestic corporation (although if shareholders of the domestic corporation owned between 
60% and 80% of the new international business, then certain gains taxes were imposed that 
diminished inversion profitability, but not to the same extent as above-80% ownership 
mandates). 
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52 U.S. Code 7874 
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 The Section 7874 addition made it extremely difficult for a company to complete an 
inversion using only business lines owned by the inverting business, whether in the same vein as 
McDermott using an existing subsidiary, or as Helen of Troy, creating a new subsidiary in a tax 
haven. The AJCA was the culmination of federal attempts to curb inversions, and even through 
the financial crisis, it was successful. There were only 3 tax inversions between 2002 and 2009
53
, 
and it seemed as if the various rounds of regulatory responses to inversion had been successful. 
This moratorium would not last, though, and it is now appropriate to address the most recent 
form of tax inversion. 
 
Post-Crisis Tax Inversions and Policy Considerations 
Many companies were unable to invert because they could not prove that they had 
substantial business activity in the new country. To circumvent these Section 7874 requirements, 
the modern, post-crisis inversion is characterized by an American firm buying an international 
company with substantial business activity in the desired country. Whereas previously, American 
firms either used an existing subsidiary or established a new foreign subsidiary, they are now 
purchasing existing foreign companies to ensure “…that there is not too much ownership 
continuity between the old U.S. company and the new combined company”54. At face value, this 
may appear to limit the American company’s choice of a new domicile to countries in which 
targets are domiciled, but in order to circumvent this issue and keep the entire world as an 
option, many companies are combining “…with a smaller existing foreign corporation using a 
                                                          
53 Only one of these inversions, Argonaut Group’s 2007 expatriation, involved an M&A 
transaction. Lazard’s 2005 IPO structured the financial services provider as a Bermudan 
company, and Western Goldfield redomiciled in Canada in 2007 
54 Hwang (2015) p. 831 
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new foreign parent whose tax residence is different from that of the existing foreign 
corporation”55.  
 Since 2009, dozens of companies have used this tactic as a means to leave the country, 
but whereas pure financial engineering motivated the preceding inversions, the fact that this new 
structure is part of an M&A transaction introduces the potential to at least hide the inversion 
behind strategic rationale. In its relocation to Canada through the acquisition of Tim Horton’s, 
Burger King Chairman Alex Behring explicitly stated, “this is not a tax-driven deal”56. CF 
Industries, one of the largest fertilizer companies in the world, used the phrase “~$500 million of 
annual after-tax run-rate synergies from optimization of operations, capital and corporate 
structure”57 to explain the benefits of its acquisition of OCI NV as only partially related to taxes.  
 This poses a challenge for regulators because they do not want to make it difficult for 
companies to engage in actual strategic investments; Burger King’s acquisition, for example, 
while structured as a tax inversion, is part of an acquisition-focused growth model, with the 
burger chain expanding its market share in the breakfast space by purchasing an international 
coffee and doughnuts business. Executives at both firms argue that the main reason for using 
Canada as the new company’s domicile was because that location would make it more likely that 
Canadian regulators would allow the transaction
5859
.  
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https://www.snl.com/Cache/1001201056.PDF?Y=&O=PDF&D=&FID=1001201056&T=&IID=453
3245 
58
 Leonard (2014) 
59 Many have suggested that this is simply an excuse, but companies even suggesting non-tax 
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 That has not stopped the Obama administration, though; in September 2014, the Treasury 
responded to Congressional inaction by announcing guidance aimed at limiting inversion 
benefits. The notice specifically addressed the issue of companies creating subsidiaries in tax 
havens, adding a rule that “…will prevent U.S. firms from essentially cherry-picking a tax-
friendly country in which to relocate their tax residence”60. The notice also limited the ability of 
a company to inflate the value of the foreign target in an attempt to stay under the 80% threshold, 
but the language echoes the prevalent ambiguity problem in anti-inversion legislation, stating, 
“…the anti-stuffing rules apply to any assets acquired with a principal purpose of avoiding the 
80-percent rule…”61. This is an intuitive rule, but it is extremely difficult to prove that an asset is 
acquired principally to avoid the 80-percent rule given that there are many different reasons to 
buy assets. 
These measures, along with slight changes to the interpretation of passive income and 
capital gains for CFC stockholders, were a failure; while there was a brief intermission during 
which lawyers and bankers interpreted the Treasury Notice, the Obama administration failed to 
address earnings stripping, one of the most significant benefits of inversion
62
. In the year 
following the Treasury Notice, six companies announced inversions and several more have 
followed their lead. Additionally, and equally as troubling, “…foreign takeovers of U.S. firms, 
which have the same effect of preventing the IRS from capturing world-wide 
earnings…exceeded $379 billion…” in the first nine months of 2015. 
Clearly, despite legislative evolution over the thirty-year history of tax inversions, the 
private sector has also evolved, and continues to find ways to circumvent Treasury and 
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Congressional measures aimed at eliminating tax-based expatriation. If progress is to be made, it 
is necessary to understand the economic motivations behind inversion rather than rely almost 
exclusively on legal measures to patch up a porous Internal Tax Code. 
 
Fiscal Implications 
 The United States used to be able to attract businesses despite using a tax code unique to 
the entire world; businesses felt that it was worth the cost of paying a nominal 35% corporate tax 
rate in a worldwide system for the benefits of being incorporated in the United States. However, 
as shareholder protection rights, capital mobility, trade agreements and labor conditions have 
changed over the past several decades, corporate emigration proves that the United States tax 
system imposes a disproportionately high cost on domestic businesses. In other words, many 
businesses no longer feel that the benefits of American incorporation warrant existence under 
such a unique and potentially harmful tax code. 
 This means that to offer a competitive environment moving forward, the United States 
either needs to increase the benefits it offers to domestic corporations or decrease the cost those 
corporations pay for American incorporation. To a certain extent, the worldwide system suggests 
that there exists American exceptionalism: the United States has the only government in the 
developed world that feels it is has the right to tax profits outside of its borders, ignoring fiscal 
sovereignty.  
It can be argued that this worldwide system enables less discipline in American fiscal 
policy; the territorial tax system allows firms to benefit from lower-tax jurisdictions, and thus 
provides incentives for governments to charge the lowest feasible tax rate to encourage firms, 
both domestic and international, to conduct business within their borders. One way to feasibly 
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charge a lower tax rate is to exhibit fiscal discipline: if the government is responsible in its 
expenditures, it will not require as much revenue to fund those expenditures, and thus can charge 
a lower tax rate. 
Conversely, “worldwide tax systems mean that companies always pay the highest 
possible tax – either the tax of their home country or the tax of the country in which they are 
operating”63. This entails an explicit guarantee to the country of domicile that no matter where 
domestic companies conduct business, the government will still earn tax revenues. In other 
words, for countries with a worldwide system there is not the same incentive to have a low tax 
rate to attract business activity with respect to domestic firms because tax revenues are not 
contingent upon domestic activity. Because the incentive to lower the tax rate does not have as 
much of an effect on these governments, that means that there also is not the same incentive for 
fiscal discipline. As long as companies continue to incorporate in worldwide-system economies 
and as long as domestic corporations don’t leave, these governments are unlikely to change their 
tax codes. 
To the extent that tax inversion represents corporate dissatisfaction with the American tax 
system, the Internal Revenue Code must adapt to the global economy in order to stay 
competitive. If the United States wants to keep the largest, most important, and most profitable 
companies domestic, it must consider lowering the corporate tax rate, abandoning the worldwide 
tax system for a territorial system, or a combination of both. With an understanding of the 
idiosyncrasies plaguing the American tax code and a thorough history of tax inversion, it is now 
appropriate to discuss the economic impact of these options. 
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Economic Considerations of Policy Changes 
 Cutting the corporate tax rate from its current level of 35% and transitioning from a 
worldwide to a territorial tax system both represent significant steps towards conformity with the 
methods economic competitors use to tax domestic corporations, and both would have a 
significant impact on the way in which both domestic and international firms would conduct 
business in the United States. There are certainly a wide range of implications for both policies, 
but this analysis will be focused on the respective impact of each policy in the context of 
corporate expatriation. 
 If the Internal Revenue Code were amended to decrease the corporate tax rate from 35% 
on a permanent basis, it would likely result in increased investment in the United States by both 
domestic and foreign companies. On a country by country basis, there are several dynamics at 
play. Consider Equation 1 below, depicting the tax differential incentive between the United 
States and any country X: 
Equation 1 
𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑽𝑬𝑿 = 𝑼𝑺𝑨_𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑵𝑬𝑾 − 𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬_𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑿 
If the new rate were higher than any Country X, then there remains a positive incentive 
for American companies to depart for X, but if the incentive is lower than it currently stands, and 
the remaining incentive is directly related to the level of the tax cut: the higher the tax cut and 
lower 𝑼𝑺𝑨_𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑵𝑬𝑾, the smaller the remaining incentive to depart for X. This is true both on a 
run-rate and repatriation basis; as the tax differential decreases between the United States and X, 
both run-rate and deferral benefits to operating in X instead of the U.S. decrease, making 
inversion less likely to the extent that these benefits motivate inversion. 
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 If the new rate were even with X, then the company would essentially operate under a 
territorial regime with respect to profits originating in X; a worldwide system requires a tax 
liability equal to the tax differential between the two countries upon repatriation, but if that 
difference is zero, then there is no additional charge. This means both on a run-rate and deferral 
basis there is no explicit incentive with respect to taxes to leave the United States for X because 
𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑽𝑬𝑿 = 𝟎, so if a company departed under this condition it would likely be due to 
another motivation such as wage dynamics or trade agreements.  
If the United States were to cut the corporate tax rate to a level below the corporate rate 
in X, then there would actually be a cost to inversion, because in this instance the American 
company would be reestablishing its domicile in a higher-tax economy. In this instance 
𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑽𝑬𝑿 < 𝟎, so inversion would be unlikely. For example, if the U.S. kept the worldwide 
system but reduced its corporate tax rate to 15%, which is below the British rate of 20%, the 
remaining incentive would be to operate on a territorial basis with respect to any countries with a 
tax rate below 15%. However, at that point, the difference is extremely small, and would require 
relocating to a higher-tax domicile. 
 Introducing new legislation that lowers the corporate tax rate, therefore, would serve to 
decrease the benefits of inversion by reducing the cost of repatriating foreign profits and 
reducing tax liabilities on a run-rate basis. Additionally, with respect to each country for which 
the new tax rate is at least as low, the decreased tax rate would have the same effect as instituting 
a territorial tax regime. It is also important to note that currently, 𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑽𝑬𝑿 > 𝟎 with 
respect to almost every country, and the longer it takes for elected officials to lower the tax rate, 
the higher the present value of that incentive. This notion will be further developed in the 
following chapter. 
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 Leaving the corporate tax rate at 35% but instituting a territorial regime would introduce 
different economic dynamics. It would eliminate the need for deferral and would encourage 
firms to repatriate profits, but there are contrasting motivations regarding how to use those 
profits. While eliminating repatriation tax will make domestic investments financed by foreign 
income less costly, it also makes foreign investments more profitable from the perspective of the 
American parent company, because repatriating foreign profits would be much cheaper. This 
means that American companies may be encouraged to pursue more foreign investments because 
it would realize the benefits of the corporate tax rate differentials with respect to each foreign 
country. 
 Perhaps even more significantly, eliminating the repatriation tax will encourage earnings 
stripping, one of the key motivations for tax inversions; while the companies would remain 
American, a territorial tax regime may encourage domestic companies to engage in similar 
behavior as inverted companies, using intra-company loans and transfer pricing techniques to 
make it appear that American profits are actually foreign, and thus avoid the residual 35% 
domestic rate. Similar to the way in which an inversion is superficial headquarters relocation, 
shifting to a territorial tax regime while the tax rate stands at 35% would allow domestic 
companies to behave similar to foreign companies while remaining superficially American. 
 Each of these represents an extreme revision to the decades-old American tax code, and 
especially considering Congressional gridlock, neither policy is likely to be enacted in the near 
term. While legislators, economists and lawyers debate about the proper approach to tax code 
modernization, America’s best and largest companies will continue to pursue tax inversions. In 
the short term, Congress and the executive branch would do well to take a lesson from the AJCA 
of 2004 and allow a tax holiday. 
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 American companies don’t necessarily want to abandon the country in which they 
incorporated; in many cases, this causes bad publicity, and the overwhelming sentiment in 
corporate America is a willingness to cooperate with legislators to create a mutually beneficial 
code
64
. Enacting a short-term tax holiday would buy time to find a real, long-term solution. 
Allowing American firms to repatriate deferred income at a low cost would decrease the short-
term benefits of inversion, and potentially eliminate inversions for several years similar to the 
way in which inversions briefly stopped after the AJCA was enacted.  
This idea faces Congressional opposition, though, as “…U.S. Senator Carl Levin called a 
tax holiday for repatriated offshore profits a failed policy that shouldn’t be repeated”65, citing job 
cuts during the 2004 holiday. Many of these job cuts occurred as a byproduct of synergies after 
American companies used repatriated profits to engage in M&A
66
. Levin fails to take into 
account the fact that during this policy, not one American company engaged in a tax inversion
67
, 
meaning that the tax holiday saved the government billions of dollars in tax revenue. 
 It is likely that over the coming years the United States will need to enact some form of a 
territorial system and decrease the corporate tax rate, but in the short term, a tax holiday will 
serve to prevent corporate expatriation, bring potentially trillions of dollars back to the United 
States
68
, and buy time for Congress to engage with the business community to establish a tax 
                                                          
64 Elected officials and corporate executives all agree that the American tax code is not 
competitive, but have not yet found a way to compromise 
65 Rubin and Zajac (2011) 
66 These job cuts, while difficult for employees, made these firms more profitable, increased 
returns to shareholders, and on a long-term basis likely improved the economy as long as those 
workers were able to find new employment 
67 Bloomberg News (2015) 
68 As previously mentioned, at the end of 2014 American companies held approximately $2.1 
trillion in offshore profits, a number that has almost certainly increased in the past 2 years 
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system that helps the United States remain competitive in an increasingly borderless global 
economy. 
 While legislators continue to weigh the costs and benefits of amending the Internal 
Revenue Code, companies also engage in careful cost-benefit analysis when deciding if 
expatriation is the right decision. When evaluating M&A opportunities, similar to the approach 
towards other investments, firms will engage in Net Present Value (NPV) analysis. However, the 
uniqueness of tax inversion transactions introduces brand new NPV considerations, and it is 
important to understand these considerations when evaluating motivations behind the maneuver. 
The following section will offer theories about NPV considerations unique to tax inversions, and 
introduce the idea of “inversion elasticity”. 
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IV. Net Present Value Theory and Tax Inversion 
 The NPV rule is an extremely intuitive approach to investment decisions and is taught in 
almost every introductory corporate finance course. An investment’s NPV is the difference 
between the present value of the benefits and the present value of the costs, and the NPV rule 
simply states “…that you should discard projects with negative NPVs and undertake all projects 
with positive NPVs”69. The structure of all of the inputs for the NPV of M&A, particularly cross-
border M&A, is extremely intricate and has been discussed extensively in prior literature. Tax 
inversion, though, represents a relatively new brand of NPV considerations, specifically in the 
context of discerning the impact of inversion on profits. 
 As previously mentioned, the tax benefits to inversion are significant. In some cases 
firms are able to reduce their tax liabilities by more than 20 percentage points, saving hundreds 
of millions of dollars on a run-rate basis. This means that each year the firm is saving (from 
Equation 1) 𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑽𝑬𝑿 ∗ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒔𝒕 every year. Assuming that profits will grow, the present 
value of these savings with respect to the parent company is calculated by Equation 2: 
Equation 2 
𝑷𝑽(𝑩𝑬𝑵𝑬𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺) =
𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑽𝑬𝑋 ∗ 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺𝒕
𝒊 − 𝒈
(𝟏 − (
(𝟏 + 𝒈)
(𝟏 + 𝒊)
)
𝒏
) + 𝑳𝑶𝑬𝒕 
 where i is the discount rate specific to each potential inverter and g is the profit rate of 
growth. N represents the number of years for which the tax differential exists, and the higher the 
value of n, the higher the present value of the benefits of inversion
70
. 𝑳𝑶𝑬𝒕 is the current balance 
                                                          
69 Ross (1995) adds that all positive NPV decisions should be made in the context of each other, 
that is, one should only take on a project if it doesn’t prevent pursuing another, more profitable 
opportunity 
70 The value of n will vary from firm to firm, depending on their belief about when, or if, 
Congress will act to reduce the corporate tax rate 
42 
 
of locked-out earnings, and does not need to be discounted because the firm will realize those 
profits immediately upon inversion.  
 There are three main sources of inversion costs, and before discussing each, the present 
value of the cost of inversion is modeled in Equation 3 below: 
Equation 3 
𝑷𝑽(𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝑺) = 𝑷𝑽(𝑰𝑵𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑺𝑰𝑶𝑵 𝑬𝑳𝑨𝑺𝑻𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑻𝒀) − 𝑷𝑽(𝑨𝑫𝑽𝑰𝑺𝑶𝑹𝒀) − 𝑷𝑽(𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑮𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵) 
where 𝑷𝑽(𝑨𝑫𝑽𝑰𝑺𝑶𝑹𝒀) is simply how much a company will have to pay lawyers, bankers and 
consultants for their advice and expertise in structuring the inversion. This cost can range from 
very little to hundreds of millions of dollars depending on which firm is enlisted and the size of 
the transaction. 
 
Inversion Elasticity 
 To understand the first term in the above equation, we use the term “inversion elasticity” 
to explain how a firm’s profits will change after inversion. Elasticity is an extremely basic 
economic term that every ECON 101 student learns in their first few classes. Put simply, it is the 
extent to which some dependent variable changes in response to a change in an independent 
variable, for example, the extent to which the quantity demanded of a good changes in response 
to a change in its price. For the purposes of this analysis, we define inversion elasticity as the 
extent to which profits
71
 change in response to a change in domicile: 
Equation 4 
𝑰𝑵𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑺𝑰𝑶𝑵 𝑬𝑳𝑨𝑺𝑻𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑻𝒀 =
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺𝑼𝑺𝑨 − 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺𝑰𝑵𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑻𝑬𝑫
𝜟𝑫𝑶𝑴𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑳𝑬
 
                                                          
71 Profits, in this theory, are more akin to revenues; we have discussed at length the impact of 
inversion on reducing costs, but this theory will be the first attempt in this analysis to discuss 
the extent to which inversion impacts a business’ revenues 
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 Firms with largely retail customers who have readily available substitutes have high 
inversion elasticities, and therefore do not frequently engage in corporate inversions. Walgreens 
is an excellent example of this phenomenon
72
; after announcing its intent to relocate to 
Switzerland after purchasing Alliance Boots in an attempt to save $4 billion over 5 years
73
, in 
August 2014 “Walgreen CEO Greg Wasson said a move to Switzerland was ‘not the right course 
of action’ as it would have led to ‘potential consumer backlash…’”74. Walgreens is a household 
name serving largely retail customers, and has several competitors such as CVS which customers 
could use in its place. So intense was the public backlash that many customers actually planned 
to boycott the chain if it went through with the inversion
75
. This means that the present value of 
inversion elasticity is large for firms such as Walgreens who serve retail customers and compete 
with a large number of substitute companies. 
 The pharmaceutical industry also serves largely retail customers in search of medication, 
but the important distinction is that there are not readily available substitutes. A consumer could 
easily substitute another pharmacy in place of Walgreens if they were upset that the company 
was leaving the U.S. That same consumer certainly would not stop taking their medication if the 
pharmaceutical company that made their drugs were leaving the United States for Ireland, 
though. If someone needs medicine to contain a life-threatening illness, it doesn’t matter where 
the drug maker is paying taxes. Politicians and the general public can, and do, freely insult 
pharmaceutical companies who plan to pursue corporate inversions, but it is not very likely that 
the move will have an impact on their bottom line. This means that despite serving the retail 
                                                          
72 Stanley Works, which abandoned its attempt to relocate to Bermuda in 2002, is also an 
excellent example of high inversion elasticity 
73 Americans for Tax Fairness (2014) 
74 Kaufman (2014) 
75 Lim (2014) 
44 
 
market, the present value of inversion elasticity is not very high for pharmaceutical companies 
because they do not operate in a market with widely available substitute goods. 
 It is clear that some companies get more bad press than others; while Pfizer has recently 
been lambasted by the press and public for moving to Ireland, very little was made of Terex 
announcing that it would move its tax domicile to Finland in its merger with Konecranes. This is 
partially due to the fact that Terex, the crane maker, does not serve retail customers. Terex is 
certainly not a household name despite its over $6 billion in annual sales, and the commercial 
customers to which it sells cranes generally do not care where the company’s tax headquarters is 
located when they sign multimillion dollar contracts with the company. This means that for large 
companies serving the commercial, rather than retail, customer, inversion elasticity is very low; 
it is unlikely that tax inversion will have a significant negative impact on operations. 
 It is important to note that these dynamics have changed over time. The U.S. government 
enacted legislation increasing inversion elasticity for companies that operate outside of the retail 
space, and ironically McDermott International, the first corporate inverter, had to spin off its 
American subsidiary to continue doing business with the Navy after “…Congress passed a law 
banning federal contracts for inverted companies”76. The Navy is certainly not a retail customer, 
but because of this new law inversion became extremely costly for any company that relies on 
contracts from any branch of the United States government. It is also possible that inversion 
elasticity actually has a positive effect on a company’s profits; perhaps relocating to a new 
country will cater to a more receptive consumer base and sales will actually increase post-
inversion
77
. 
                                                          
76 Mider (2014) 
77 Subtracting 
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺𝑼𝑺𝑨−𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺𝑰𝑵𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑻𝑬𝑫
𝜟𝑫𝑶𝑴𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑳𝑬
 when 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺𝑼𝑺𝑨 − 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝑺𝑰𝑵𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑻𝑬𝑫 < 𝟎 
would have a positive effect on the NPV of inversion 
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 Graph 1 below illustrates the number of inversions that have taken place by industry; the 
stark contrast between the number of inversions in the health, industrial and resources sectors 
compared to inversions in more retail-friendly financial services, retail and technology, media 
and telecom industries certainly supports the notion that historically, companies with retail 
consumers and readily available substitutes have a higher inversion elasticity. 
Graph 1 
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 We can also consider inversion elasticity as a means to understand inversion as an 
arbitrage opportunity. Arbitrage is taking advantage of price differentials between identical 
assets, for example, buying an asset at a low price on one exchange and selling the exact same 
asset for a higher price on another. We can view tax regimes as prices, and the assets in this 
instance are the economic implications of being domiciled in each country. Let us use the recent 
migration from the United States to Ireland as an example of this theory. 
                                                          
78 This data uses the Thompson Reuters sample available at 
http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/14/inversion/index.html 
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 The price corresponding to the “asset” of American incorporation is a 35% tax rate in a 
worldwide system, and the price of Irish incorporation is a 12.5% tax rate in a system that is 
effectively territorial. Several decades ago, when the United States clearly represented a more 
hospitable environment for ambitious entrepreneurs in the form of political stability, business 
and property laws, advanced capital markets and a relatively competent workforce, the asset of 
American incorporation was certainly more valuable than the asset of Irish incorporation which 
was plagued by relatively weak capital markets, a weak monetary system, political instability 
and a relatively less-skilled work force. The difference in asset quality explained the difference 
in prices, in other words, the difference in tax regimes, the same way it is more expensive to eat 
at the Capital Grille than Mather Hall. This means that inversion elasticity with respect to 
earnings was high; while American firms would benefit from a less burdensome tax regime, 
operating in the Irish economy versus the United States would have had such an adverse impact 
on profits as to make the maneuver no longer profitable. Arbitrage theory would not apply in this 
case, because there was a clear difference in asset quality. 
 However, it is clear that over the past several decades the prices have stayed the same 
while the difference in the quality of the assets has changed. The United States still offers 
domestic firms an excellent business climate
79
 relative to the rest of the world, but that relative 
advantage has decreased significantly, especially with respect to countries like Ireland. The Irish 
economy has greatly improved its infrastructure, capital markets and quality of employees, 
reducing inversion elasticity with respect to earnings. Now, relocating to Ireland would no longer 
have a clearly adverse impact on earnings, and may in fact increase earnings as the Irish 
workforce and political climate improved, a phenomenon we define as low inversion elasticity. 
                                                          
79 Removing taxes from the equation 
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 The transition from high to low inversion elasticity means that the value of the asset, an 
Irish domicile, has increased, and to the extent that a firm’s business operations would not 
change if it were operated in Ireland as opposed to the U.S., the value of each asset is essentially 
equal, despite the persistent price differential in the form of a relatively burdensome American 
tax regime. We interpret corporate migration from the U.S. to Ireland, then as firms responding 
to this arbitrage opportunity. In this framework, the asset of business operations is the exact same 
in the United States as it is in Ireland. By engaging in tax inversion, we conclude that American 
companies sell the asset with the high price (American incorporation) and simultaneously buy 
the asset with the low price (reestablishing with an Irish domicile), pocketing the difference 
(increased returns on a run rate basis). 
 
Integration Risk 
 In earlier sections we discussed the fact that early inversions were conducted intra-
company; that is, the firm either used an existing subsidiary or created a new one, in a sense 
keeping it “all in the family”. The early inversion did not involve a separate entity. Fast forward 
to the post-crisis inversion that requires the acquisition of or merger with an entirely different 
company; while these mergers and acquisitions involve companies in the same line of business, 
there still exist the same execution and integration risk inherent in any M&A transaction. That 
tax inversions require merger with a large enough company to qualify for relocation and are 
cross-border by nature makes them even risker on an execution and integration basis. As former 
Morgan Stanley Investment Banking Chairman and Perella Weinberg founder Joseph R. Perella 
writes, “a successful merger is not the result of the contracts and documents binding 
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organizations together; rather, it is a function of the implicit agreements governing the conduct 
of all individuals involved and the effects the new organization will have on these individuals”80.  
 As the chapter discussing the model’s sample will explain, companies pursuing 
inversions will do so with targets that minimize execution and integration risk. Acquiring a 
company that operates in the same space is an important first step; it would be much more 
difficult to integrate Burger King and Volkswagon, for example, than Burger King and Tim 
Horton’s. Interestingly, it also appears that firms try to mitigate integration risk by purchasing 
targets in English-speaking countries, or countries in which a large portion of the population 
speak English, as evidenced by Graph 2 below: 
Graph 2 
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 By purchasing targets in the same industry that have the same consumer base and speak 
the same language, American companies pursuing tax inversion are able to mitigate integration 
risk and maximize the net present value of inversion. 
                                                          
80 Excerpt from the Forward of “Applied Mergers and Acquisitions” by Robert F. Bruner (2004) 
81 This data uses the Thompson Reuters sample available at 
http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/14/inversion/index.html 
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 It is important at this juncture to revisit legislation discussed in Section 3 mandating that 
in order for a cross-border transaction to qualify for inversion, the American buyer cannot hold 
more than 80% of the pro forma entity, and if it owns between 60% and 80% of NewCo the 
financial benefits are greatly reduced. This means that for companies considering inversion, there 
is a very limited number of businesses they can acquire that will enable them to accomplish their 
goal. 
 The integration process is much easier after acquiring a small company versus a larger 
one; consider the integration process after a hypothetical Starbucks acquisition of Peter B’s 
versus the integration between Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts, for example. Certainly the 
onboarding process for Peter B’s would be easier because there are fewer employees, locations 
and operations to integrate, as opposed to Dunkin Donuts, which has complex global systems 
dictating its operations, thousands of stores around the world and a deeply-rooted culture. The 
integration costs and risks for the large merger, therefore, are much more significant than they 
are for the small acquisition. 
 Due to Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code, every transaction that is structured as 
a tax inversion requires an American firm to buy a large international competitor, which serves 
to increase integration risk. Where there was essentially zero integration risk in McDermott’s 
inversion because it was an intra-company transaction
82
, tax inversion regulations have evolved 
to introduce significant integration risks in an attempt to decrease the NPV of inversion, and 
ultimately reduce the number of inversions that take place. 
                                                          
82 In fact, until the AJCA caused tax inversions to evolve from intra-company structural 
adjustments to complex cross-border M&A, there was very little, if any, integration risk in tax 
inversions 
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 It is important to note, also, that these integration risks begin as soon as the transaction is 
announced. By agreeing to become the target of an inversion, the foreign company makes its 
shareholders vulnerable to dynamics related to the deal, for example, being unable to overcome 
regulatory and antitrust hurdles. On April 4, 2016, the U.S. Treasury announced brand new 
legislation aimed at curbing post-inversion earnings stripping and the extent to which prior 
inversions and acquisitions can be included in target valuation
83. Allergan’s stock immediately 
dropped over 15% after the news, cutting its market capitalization by about $18 billion
84
, an 
example of the volatility to which targets are susceptible. To mitigate this risk and increase the 
likelihood that the target’s shareholders will approve the transaction, high-profile deals often 
include a termination fee that would come into play if the transaction was terminated for any 
reason; if Pfizer and Allergan ultimately decide to cut ties, this will entail a $400 million dollar 
payment for Pfizer
8586
. This means that even if the transaction doesn’t close, Pfizer is liable to 
pay $400 million and endure all of the negative press, very clear and tangible examples of the 
large potential costs of inversion. 
 After thousands of hours’ worth of analysis from lawyers, bankers, consultants and 
internal strategy teams, it is ultimately up to company executives and boards of directors to pull 
the trigger on the transaction. In the rare occasion that a firm decides to pursue a tax inversion, 
this means that their analysis yields a positive NPV; in other words, the tax rate differential and 
                                                          
83 The higher the target valuation the inverter is able to prove, the higher the likelihood it stays 
under the 60% threshold, enabling the company to reap the pro forma benefits of inversion. 
There was a great deal of speculation that this measure specifically targeted Pfizer’s inversion 
to Ireland through its merger with Allergan 
84 Allergan’s shares were down 19% in pre-market trading, but recovered slightly when the 
market opened from Petroff (2016) 
85 McCracken (2016) 
86 Syngenta rejected Monsanto’s takeover offer in the summer of 2015 despite a $2 billion 
takeover fee (Kaskey 2016) 
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locked-out earnings benefits outweigh the potentially adverse impacts of inversion elasticity and 
integration risk, along with agency costs.  
 
Graph 3 
87
 
 Despite the fact that these NPV exist constantly, it is clear that their dynamics cause 
boards of directors to behave in a sort of “wave” mentality. Graph 3 above clearly depicts that 
over the past two decades, there have been periods of high activity followed by lulls, and 
considering the fact that several tax inversions have already been announced in 2016, it is 
reasonable to say that we are currently in a period of high activity. The following section 
examines the nature of this herd-like mentality using Stearns and Allan’s 1996 model of the 
1980s LBO wave. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87 Using data from Bloomberg News (2015) 
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V. An Updated Application of Merger Wave Theory 
Stearns and Allan’s Institutional Environments Theory 
 In their innovative 1996 paper, “Economic Behavior in Institutional Environments: The 
Corporate Merger Wave of the 1980s”, Stearns and Allan study the political and economic 
climates in which merger activity increases. This analysis leads to a useful model for 
understanding what causes and ends the merger waves that clearly exist
88
. Similar to the 
argument in earlier chapters of this thesis, the authors claim that “…the socio-political setting in 
which mergers take place is as important as the economic setting” (p. 701).  
 Stearns and Allan claim that economic and political changes must occur simultaneously 
in order for a merger wave to begin, and cite an increase in available capital in the context of 
relaxed regulatory bodies. They define two different categories of firms who act in response to 
these changes; “challengers” are economic entities who operate near the establishment, but are 
fringe players who have an incentive to shake things up. “Members” are constrained by 
expectations and have an incentive to protect their reputation. They have earned a place in the 
establishment, and do not have an incentive to shake things up because they have reached the 
pinnacle of corporate America.  
 Challengers experiment with new innovations, and use mergers as a means to gain market 
share in ways that members cannot. To the extent that challengers succeed in shocking the 
system, members will “…start to adopt the challengers’ methods so as to cash in on the larger 
profits they offer. When this happens, the innovations diffuse quickly throughout the business 
                                                          
88 In fact, “…over 50 percent of all merger activity in the United States in the last 100 years has 
taken place during one of four merger waves” (p. 699) 
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community” (p. 703). In the context of the LBO wave of the 1980s, the political and economic 
dynamics that enabled the wave were threefold
89
.  
 
Discussion of the 1980s LBO Wave 
On the economic front, as the international economy expanded, borders lost their 
meaning and capital markets became much more global, presenting much easier access to funds 
for firms looking to expand. The key regulatory relaxation that fueled the merger wave was the 
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
90
 that allowed thrift institutions to make a 
wider range of investments. As Stearns and Allan explain, “once limited to investing primarily in 
single-family homes, the act enabled S&Ls (savings and loan institutions) to make business loans 
and to invest in corporate securities” (p. 704). Finally, the massive growth of mutual funds91 
represents investor appetite for opportunities to put money to work. 
The confluence of these dynamics presented challengers with a fantastic opportunity to 
earn massive profits simply by feeding investor appetite. Two firms, Drexel Burnham Lambert 
(DBL) and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) combined their financial innovations to greatly 
expand access to capital and what appeared to be the perfect investment opportunity for that 
capital. KKR pioneered the LBO, a transaction in which “…a company is acquired by a 
specialized investment firm (in this case, KKR) using a relatively small portion of equity and a 
relatively large portion of outside debt financing” 92 during the 1960s. The idea is that by holding 
the acquired company as an investment for several years and using its free cash flow to pay 
                                                          
89 The following three dynamics are discussed on pp. 704-705 
90 See https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-4100.html 
91 A fivefold increase from $46 billion in assets under management to almost $300 billion 
between 1978 and 1983 (p. 704) 
92 Kaplan and Stromberg (2008) 
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down the debt, returns to equity shareholders will provide above-market returns. They were 
unable to grow as quickly as possible, though, because it was very difficult to find enough 
outside debt financing, or leverage. 
Enter DBL, which was responsible for turning the junk bond market into a newly viable 
and highly liquid source of investment opportunities for investors, such as mutual funds, and 
capital for borrowers, such as financial sponsors trying to engage in LBOs
93
. These two financial 
agents, one a market-maker and one an investor group, were both challengers who exploited 
opportunities in the political and economic landscapes along with innovation in the form of junk 
bonds to fuel the merger wave that ensued. 
 Stearns and Allan suggest that changes in the economic and political landscape end 
merger waves, and political and economic headwinds surfaced in the late 1980s that would do 
just that. The authors explain the way in which the political environment changed, stating, “the 
Bush Administration’s and Congress’s new posturing put the business community on notice that 
it no longer had carte blanche” (p. 713). At the same time, the October 1987 stock crash 
introduced volatility to a previously tame market, and the prospect of rising rates and a potential 
recession combined to make debt more expensive and less palatable for investors. These 
dynamics conspired to end LBOs, and in turn end the merger wave of the 1980s. We now present 
an analysis of the extent to which this model can be used to understand the dynamics currently 
motivating the wave of tax inversions, beginning with a discussion of the political and economic 
landscape in which the wave began. 
 
                                                          
93 Stearns and Allan note that “between 1983 and 1989, nonfinancial corporations issued $160 
billion of junk bonds to the public… (accounting) for more than 35 percent of total public bond 
offerings” (p. 708) 
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Updated Application of Stearns and Allan’s Merger Wave Model 
 The modern tax inversion wave was borne out of the financial crisis, a period in which 
boards of directors were desperately searching for new ways to return capital to shareholders in 
the face of financial turmoil and limited organic investment prospects. Tax inversion represented 
a legal maneuver to restructure a company’s organization, freeing up capital and potentially 
increasing investor returns. The immediate global rate cuts made capital the cheapest it had ever 
been, and offered a new source of financing should a firm choose to pursue M&A.  On the 
political front, regulators from international competitors were doing whatever they could to 
entice American firms to leave the United States and domicile in their country
94
. The innovation 
that fueled the inversion boom was the inversion itself; the new structure as part of a strategic 
M&A transaction provided a shield from the negative press that haunted early forms of inversion 
that clearly were tax plays. 
 It is important to note that because of the extreme circumstances surrounding the 
financial crisis, the challengers were actually members, but the economic system of which they 
were established members had fallen apart, opening the opportunity for members to act in 
challenging ways. Perhaps no agent has profited more from the tax inversion boom than the 
historic law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom which has advised on “78% of 
inversions by deal value since 2011”95. After developing the inversion idea on a company bike 
trip, they challenged the status quo by presenting this idea to corporate clients. 
                                                          
94 The Irish Development Agency’s website proudly states “Ireland is one of the best places in 
the world to do business” at the top. The Agency further claims “we favour green lights over 
red tape” and “new business is welcomed and supported by the flow of talent coming from our 
schools” in an attempt to offer contrast between the Irish and American business environments 
http://www.idaireland.com/ 
95 Per Thompson Reuters data compiled by Rice (2014) 
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 Other agents, namely top global investment banks, bought into the idea and began 
advising in tandem with Skadden. Large investment banks with international operations brought 
to the table not only considerable valuation and capital markets expertise, but also a global client 
base, meaning that they are uniquely positioned to advise American clients on cross-border 
acquisitions.  
The combination of third-party financial and legal advice was convincing enough that 
large, historic American brands quickly realized the value of this strategy, and began to engage 
in tax inversions. Wall Street Journal reporter Shayndi Raice noted that inversions accounted for 
just 1% of outbound cross-border M&A in 2011, but at the time of her writing in August of 
2014, the maneuver accounted for 66%. This sharp rise is due to only a few deals relative to the 
total number of outbound acquisitions, indicating the massive size of these transactions. 
 Whereas unestablished challengers began the merger wave in the 1980s, the first 
American company to engage in a transaction-based inversion was Valeant, a large, well-
established pharmaceutical company. The immediacy with which the corporate establishment 
attempted to copy this strategy speaks not only to its value, but also to its temporary nature. 
Firms understood that it only takes one piece of legislation to close the loophole through which 
they were trying to leave, and there was a race for the exit, exacerbating the wave dynamic. 
 Similar to the way in which Congress imposed new laws on the market for junk bonds 
and on LBO execution that put a stop to the merger wave, legislation has also been very recently 
brought forth in an attempt to end this merger wave. On April 4, 2016, the Treasury announced 
action to “limit inversions by disregarding foreign parent stock attributable to recent inversions 
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or acquisitions of U.S. companies” and “address earnings stripping”96. It will take months, and 
more likely years, to learn if this action will prove to cause the “…collapse of the most important 
innovation…”97, in this case, inversion. 
 Early speculation suggests that these measures will be successful, as Pfizer announced 
two days later that it would not go through with its announced merger with Allergan; in 
response, Max Nisen of Bloomberg wrote, “with hubris and attempted mega-deals, the 
(pharmaceutical) industry called forth the wrath of the U.S. Treasury Department against 
inversions…”98. He also suggests the notion of inversions as only one aspect of a strategic 
acquisition is a façade, stating, “both sets of companies had long protested their mergers were 
about strategic fit, not just taxes. In Pfizer and Allergan’s case, it took less than two days for the 
deal’s death to put lie to that”99. 
 While it will certainly take a longer time frame to learn what causes tax inversions to end, 
it is clear that Stearns and Allan’s 1996 model of the dynamics behind merger waves can be used 
to understand the tax inversion merger wave that began in 2010. At this juncture, with a 
historical and theoretical perspective of corporate expatriation, we will proceed to an 
econometric analysis of the ways in which tax inversion differ from traditional cross-border 
M&A with an American acquirer. 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 The Treasury action, available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0405.aspx, was more harsh than expected 
97 Stearns and Allan (1996) p. 712 
98 Nisen (2016) 
99 id 
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VI. Hypothesis Discussion, Data Discussion and Data Limitations 
Hypothesis Discussion 
 The following econometric analysis will test two hypotheses for tax inversion motivation. 
Given the large differential between the U.S. corporate tax rate of 35% and the corporate tax rate 
in other economies, inversion is an opportunity to realize a significant run rate benefit
100
. After 
inversion, the firm’s newly-lowered effective tax rate, sometimes referred to as a “structural 
synergy”, is realized every year that the company is domiciled abroad rather than in the United 
States. Extrapolated for several years, this run rate reduction in effective tax rate is a significant 
motivation for American companies to consider relocating their domicile abroad. It can be 
inferred, then, that the larger the potential run-rate structural synergy contained in a cross-border 
transaction, the higher the motivation to structure that transaction as an inversion. 
 The second motivation for inversion, which has been discussed at length in earlier 
chapters, is the opportunity to abandon the worldwide tax system in the United States in favor of 
a territorial system elsewhere. The severe reduction or elimination of a repatriation tax would 
free up existing locked-out earnings
101
, and cheap intra-company capital flows would serve to 
improve capital allocation efficiency. Additionally, a territorial system would enable expatriated 
companies to use earnings stripping
102
 as a means to reduce American profits subjected to the 
35% rate. These dynamics combine for a very compelling motivation to use cross-border M&A 
as a means to invert. 
                                                          
100 The only two countries with higher corporate tax rates than the United States where a run 
rate benefit would not exist are Puerto Rico and the United Arab Emirates. As of writing no 
American company has used a tax inversion to relocate their domicile to either of these 
economies. 
101 Bird, Edwards and Shevlin (2015) demonstrates a strong positive relationship between an 
American firm’s locked-out earnings balance and the probability that it is acquired by a 
company domiciled in a territorial tax economy 
102 Avi-Yonah (2015) suggests that “…the main driver for most inversions…is earnings stripping” 
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 The following section will explain the data collection, sample, and dependent, 
explanatory and control variables constructed to test these hypotheses. 
 
Data Sources 
 There are three key sources of data: the Bloomberg Terminal Service provides an 
extensive database of all cross-border M&A transactions with an American buyer, along with 
historical financial statements and capital markets data for the targets; the Bloomberg News 
“Tracking Tax Runaways”103 database offers a complete database of all tax inversions since 
1982; the World Bank provides all historical economic data on a country by country basis. To 
the extent that any historical financial data was not available on the Bloomberg Terminal, the 
relevant company’s 10-K was consulted from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
“EDGAR” database104 to fill in this gap. 
 
Data Limitations 
 The control variables consist of a wide range of financial data; to ensure that enough data 
was available and reliable, the sample must be limited to transactions in which the target was a 
publicly traded company. Private companies are not required to report audited financial 
statements, so transactions in which the target was private would not yield enough data to use as 
control variables. This means that while 25 tax inversions were announced between 2010 and 
2015, only 17 are included in the sample, and 244 total transactions are included out of all the 
cross-border activity over the past 5 years. 
                                                          
103 Bloomberg News (2015) 
104 SEC’s EDGAR 
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 Additionally, while the Bloomberg Terminal includes a very large M&A database, it is 
extremely difficult to be certain that the sample includes every qualifying cross-border 
acquisition from 2010 to 2015.  
 
Sample Construction 
 Tax inversions represent a unique subset of cross-border M&A transactions. To examine 
the motivations behind tax inversion, the entire sample of cross-border M&A transactions must 
be considered. Using the Advanced Search Bloomberg <MA> function, every cross-border 
acquisition in which the buyer was an American company was gathered. The sample was limited 
to transactions consisting of a majority purchase of at least $25 million from 2010-2015
105
. 
Acquisitions in which the acquirer was a financial sponsor, such as a private equity firm or 
supranational entity, were excluded because the hypothesized tax motivations do not apply to 
these buyers
106
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 The 2009 Financial Crisis presents a challenging year in which to evaluate motivations, and 
the modern form of tax inversion (structured as part of a cross-border acquisition) became 
extremely popular in 2010. Restricting the data to only apply to transactions since 2010 also 
increases the reliability of the financial information, and makes it easier to audit 
106 Bird (2015) uses a similar approach, stating, “we also exclude all acquisitions by private 
equity and non-taxable entities as the hypothesized tax motivated effect should not impact 
these acquirers” 
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VII. Variable Definitions 
Explanatory Variable Discussion 
 Prior studies analyzing merger motivation use a large sample of firms over a specified 
period of time, and the binary, observable dependent variable is whether or not each company 
was acquired
107
. This thesis will utilize a similar methodology. The sample consists of a large 
sample of cross-border acquisitions with an American acquirer, and the binary, observable 
dependent variable is whether or not the transaction was structured as a tax inversion. For each 
observation, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 1 if the transaction was a tax inversion, otherwise 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 0. 
 To test each of the tax motivation hypotheses, this analysis calls for three explanatory 
variables. To examine the motivation that arises out of the run rate benefit of relocation to a 
lower-tax economy, we compute the difference between the American acquirer’s effective tax 
rate and that of the foreign target, using Equation 5 below: 
Equation 5 
𝑻𝑨𝑿_𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑭𝒊 = 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑼𝑺𝑨 − 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑵𝑬𝑾 
where 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑼𝑺𝑨 is the effective tax rate of the American buyer in the prior fiscal year and 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑵𝑬𝑾 is the effective tax rate of the foreign target in the prior fiscal year. Occasionally in a 
tax inversion, the American firm may acquire a target in one country but use another company as 
the domicile for NewCo
108
. In this instance, 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑵𝑬𝑾 was calculated using the NewCo domicile, 
rather than the target domicile. This assumes that the pro forma foreign entity will have the same 
                                                          
107 See Harris et al. (1980) 
108 For example, Cyberonics announced the acquisition of Sorin, an Italian company, on 
February 26,2015, but stated in the investor relations merger announcement that NewCo 
would be domiciled in the United Kingdom 
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effective tax rate as the target, and we assume 𝑻𝑨𝑿_𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑭𝒊 = 𝟎 for standard cross-border 
acquisitions in which the parent of NewCo remains the American buyer.  
As an alternative measure of run-rate tax differentials, we consider the difference 
between the nominal
109
 American tax rate that the acquirer currently pays and the nominal 
corporate tax rate of the country in which the target is domiciled using Equation 6 below: 
Equation 6 
𝑷𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑰𝑨𝑳_𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑭𝒊 = 𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬_𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑼𝑺𝑨 − 𝑪𝑶𝑹𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬_𝑹𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑻𝑨𝑹𝑮𝑬𝑻 
This equation represents the nominal potential difference of relocating from the American 
economy to that of the target.  
 To examine the extent to which reorganizing in a territorial system serves as motivation 
for inversion, a simple dummy variable is used. 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖 = 1 if the acquisition target 
resides in an economy that uses a worldwide tax system, and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖 = 0 if the target is 
in an economy that uses a territorial system.  
 
Control Variable Definitions 
 Building off of prior studies, there are several categories of control variables used in this 
analysis, namely: size, profitability, valuation, capital structure and business cycle. A firm’s size 
will affect the likelihood that the transaction is structured as a tax inversion, especially given the 
complicated legalese dictating which kind of acquisitions are and are not eligible to be tax 
inversions. To control for this, we gather the reported figures for sales in the prior fiscal year, 
total assets and enterprise value at the end of the last fiscal year, and market capitalization. When 
                                                          
109 We use nominal in this context as the legal corporate tax rate in each domicile, thus avoiding 
the nuances of transfer pricing and tax benefits that are idiosyncratic to each individual 
company and difficult to quantify 
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conducting pro forma analysis, these metrics are of critical importance in forecasting NewCo’s 
financial position. Three-year average sales growth is also included in an effort to control for the 
target firm’s stage of growth. 
 Profitability is another important metric that impacts merger activity; whether acquiring a 
largely profitable business in hopes of reaping the benefits of proven success or purchasing a 
“fixer upper” company struggling to produce results, a target firm’s profitability is an important 
metric. To control for this, we use the prior year’s earnings per share and EBITDA110 margin. 
Undoubtedly, firm valuation is of critical importance in merger behavior; to control for this 
dynamic, we calculate two important multiples. Tobin’s Q, developed by Nobel laureate James 
Tobin, compares a firm’s capital markets valuation to the replacement cost of its assets, 
illustrated in Equation 7 below: 
Equation 7 
𝑻𝑶𝑩𝑰𝑵𝑺_𝑸𝑖 =
𝑴𝑲𝑻_𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑖
𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳_𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑺𝑖
 
The Enterprise-Value-to-Revenue multiple is included due to its importance in 
acquisition valuation, and is calculated in Equation 8 below: 
Equation 8 
𝑬𝑽_𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝑖 =
𝑬𝑽𝑖
𝑺𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑺𝑖
 
 Companies certainly employ a multitude of strategies regarding capital structure; some 
firms operate using very low debt levels, while others rely heavily on debt to fund operations. 
Both ends of this spectrum will impact the decision to invert, so we include total debt, 
shareholder equity and the debt-to-equity ratio to control for this dynamic. 
                                                          
110 EBITDA is widely used by practitioners because it avoids the myriad of approaches 
accountants use to calculate depreciation and amortization, and is considered “pure” earnings 
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 Business cycle dynamics both in the United States and the target country will impact the 
inversion decision. To control for the business cycle the annual GDP growth and unemployment 
rate during the year in which the acquisition was announced are included for both the United 
States and the target’s country of domicile. 
 We also include two country characteristic variables that may impact the inversion 
decision. When a company purchases a foreign target in an inversion, as opposed to a traditional 
cross-border acquisition, it commits to relocate its headquarters to a new country, showing a 
great deal of commitment to that economy’s legal structure and culture. In an attempt to control 
for this commitment and in light of Equation 3, we include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
target country
111
 lists English as its official language, and 0 otherwise. We also include the target 
country’s Human Development Index (HDI), which ranges from 0 to 1 and “…is a summary 
measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy 
life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living”112. This metric was created by 
the United Nations Development Programme, and presents a holistic picture of the standard of 
living in the target’s country. 
 We will now consider the sample’s composition on a country and industry basis, and then 
turn to the model’s specifications, outputs and interpretations. 
 
Country and Industry Considerations
113
 
 The sample’s composition of 244 total cross-border transactions, of which 17 were 
constructed as tax inversions, suggest that the theories we presented that impact the NPV of 
                                                          
111 Similar to the tax rate differential variables, for inversions, we use the new country of 
residence if it is different from the target firm’s country 
112 United Nations Human Development Index 
113 See Appendix for Descriptive Statistics and the Country and Industry Breakdowns 
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expatriation actually impact inversion motivation. We observe that 88% of tax inversion targets 
are from English-speaking countries, compared to only 40% for traditional outbound M&A, 
certainly speaking to the idea that English-speaking targets help mitigate integration risk by 
avoiding language and cultural barriers. Further proving this notion is the fact that the three most 
popular locations for tax inversion in the sample are Ireland, the United Kingdom and Canada. It 
is difficult to think of three countries that are more similar to the United States. 
 Additionally, the sample certainly suggests that there are sector-specific dynamics 
reflecting different levels of inversion elasticity; medical and pharmaceutical industries make up 
65% of the inversions in the sample, while energy makes another 12%. This means that almost 
80% of the inversion sample comes from two industries with very few substitutes, and therefore 
very low inversion elasticity. Compare this to the less than 20% share that medical technology, 
pharmaceutical, energy and biotechnology firms have of traditional cross-border acquisitions. 
 Perhaps the most surprising and potentially misleading takeaway from the descriptive 
statistics is the fact that 40%
114
 of inverters leave the United States for another country with a 
worldwide tax system. This certainly contradicts likely motivations discussed earlier in this 
thesis, in particular Avi-Yonah’s 2015 claim that the main motivation for tax inversion is 
earnings stripping. Paying closer attention to the data, though, every single tax inversion to a 
worldwide tax system was to Ireland, a country with a 12.5% tax rate that is effectively territorial 
because that level is below almost every other country. Taking this into account and considering 
Ireland as a territorial system, there were no inversions to worldwide economies. 
 We will now use Probit analysis to examine the extent to which these observations are 
statistically significant. 
                                                          
114 See Table 6 of the Appendix 
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VIII. Probit Analysis 
Effective Tax Rate Differential Form 
 Specification 1 below specifies the model using the effective tax rate differential as the 
key explanatory variable, and Figure 1 depicts the Stata output. 
Specification 1 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐼𝑆𝐻𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖 +
𝛽10𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑉_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴_𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 +
𝛽15𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇_𝑇𝑂_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽17𝑇𝐺𝑇_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 +
𝛽18𝑇𝐺𝑇_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽19𝑈𝑆_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑈𝑆_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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Figure 1 
 
  
 The extremely low p-value from the likelihood ratio test leads us to conclude that this 
specification of the model has strong explanatory power in predicting whether a cross-border 
transaction was structured as an inversion for not. Analyzing the z-statistics, 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, leading us to the predicted conclusion that there is a 
statistically significantly positive relationship between the size of a tax differential and the 
likelihood that a cross-border transaction is structured as an inversion. 
 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 is also statistically significant at the 10% level, allowing us 
to conclude that there is a statistically significantly positive relationship between the book value 
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of shareholder equity and the likelihood that a transaction is structured as a tax inversion; in 
other words, larger target firms are more likely to be involved in tax inversions than smaller 
firms. This is likely due to Section 7874, preventing American companies from using small 
foreign acquisitions to relocate by mandating that the inversion would only be fully recognized if 
the American inverter had lower than a 60% equity stake in the new company. The fact that 
𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖 is not statistically significant speaks to this notion as well; the IRS does not 
recognize capital markets valuation in this determination, rather, it only considers total 
shareholder equity. 
 It is interesting, and perhaps surprising, that 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖 is not statistically 
significant. Relocating to another worldwide tax system appears counterintuitive based on prior 
analysis of merger motivation suggesting that one of the main motivations for inversion is 
earnings stripping. This suggests that in reality, firms value the run-rate tax differential as more 
important than the method of global taxation, potentially because the lower the tax rate, the less 
significant the impact of repatriation tax
115
. The extent to which the target country speaks 
English and the Human Development Index are also insignificant, leading us to conclude from 
this specification that the motivation for tax inversion is the run-rate tax differential contingent 
upon the target firm being large enough to qualify for inversion. We will now consider Figure 2, 
which depicts the marginal effects of each variable at its mean. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
115 Ireland is an excellent example of this phenomenon. It taxes profits on a worldwide basis, 
but because of its extremely low 12.5% tax rate, repatriation tax is essentially nonexistent 
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Figure 2 
 
 Interestingly, we conclude that at its mean, there is almost an exact 1-for-1 relationship 
between the tax differential and the likelihood a cross-border acquisition: a 1-basis point increase 
in the tax differential leads to a 1-basis point increase in the likelihood ratio. We also conclude 
that at its mean, a $100 million increase in the book value of shareholder equity increases the 
likelihood that a cross-border transaction is an inversion by 3%. 
 
Selected Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 We perform likelihood ratio tests on various categories of variables to determine the 
extent to which they are statistically significant in predicting whether a cross-border acquisition 
is structured as a tax inversion. Figure 3 depicts the output of a likelihood ratio test for the model 
restricted to non-tax variables, and as expected, the extremely low p-value leads us to conclude 
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that the tax variables 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖   and 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖 are statistically significant in predicting 
inversion. 
Figure 3 – Likelihood Ratio Test for Tax Variable Significance 
 
 Figure 4 evaluates the extent to which capital structure variables, 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 and 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇_𝑇𝑂_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖, are statistically significant in predicting 
inversion. This variable group is interesting to consider because the book value of equity is 
statistically significant in predicting inversion. 
Figure 4 – Likelihood Ratio Test for Capital Structure Significance 
 
 Despite shareholder equity’s significance, the p-value of .1656 leads us to conclude that 
capital structure is not statistically significant in predicting tax inversions from cross-border 
acquisitions. This means that inversion targets do not have statistically significantly different 
capital structures from other international firms acquired by American companies. 
 
Nominal Tax Rate Differential Form 
 We also analyze the data using the nominal, or potential, tax rate differential using the 
below specification. Where the effective tax rate differential attempts to quantify the actual run-
rate benefit from each announced transaction, the nominal tax rate represents the potential 
differential a company would realize if it left the U.S. for the domicile of the acquisition target.  
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Specification 2 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝐴𝐿_𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐿𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐼𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖 +
𝛽10𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑉_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴_𝑀𝐺𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿_𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 +
𝛽15𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇_𝑇𝑂_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽17𝑇𝐺𝑇_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 +
𝛽18𝑇𝐺𝑇_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽19𝑈𝑆_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽20𝑈𝑆_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Figure 5 
 
 This model also results in an extremely low p-value for the likelihood ratio test, but it is 
interesting to note changes in the significance of control variables that result from using the 
72 
 
nominal tax difference as opposed to the effective tax rate differential. The tax rate differential 
remains significant at the 1% level, leading to the conclusion that there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between the nominal tax rate differential and the likelihood that 
a cross-border acquisition is an inversion. This means that cross-border acquisitions involving 
targets from countries with lower nominal tax rates are more likely to be structured as inversions, 
certainly a logical conclusion. 
 Interestingly, in this specification, a company’s EPS is significant at the 10% level, 
leading us to conclude that there exists a statistically significantly positive relationship between a 
company’s earnings per share and the likelihood that it is part of an inversion. This means that 
given a cross-border acquisition of targets from two countries with the exact same nominal 
difference in corporate tax rates, the acquisition of the company with the higher earnings per 
share is more likely to be part of an inversion.  
Again, we conclude that the difference between a target company operating in a territorial 
versus worldwide tax regime is insignificant, and the characteristic variables remain insignificant 
in this specification as well. As opposed to the marginal tax rate differential specification, the 
level of shareholder equity is not statistically significant in predicting tax inversions out of cross-
border acquisitions in this model. 
We now present Figure 6, which shows the marginal effects of each independent 
variable. 
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Figure 6 
 
 The marginal effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the nominal tax rate differential at 
its mean is a .8% increase in the likelihood that the cross-border acquisition is structured as a tax 
inversion, and a $1 increase in the target company’s EPS at its mean leads to a .32% increase in 
the likelihood that that firm’s acquisition is part of a tax inversion. 
 
Selected Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 We again perform likelihood ratio tests on the specification to examine the extent to 
which various categories of variables are statistically significant in predicting whether or not a 
cross-border acquisition is part of a tax inversion.  
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Figure 7 – Likelihood Ratio Test for Country Characteristic Significance 
  
 The extremely low p-value in Figure 7 indicates that despite being insignificant on their 
own, the combination of “country characteristic” variables, 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 and 𝐸𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐼𝑆𝐻𝑖,  are 
statistically significant in predicting inversion. This means that in the context of nominal, rather 
than effective, differentials, the target country’s quality of life and whether or not its citizens 
speak English are significant in predicting inversion. Consider two countries, both of which have 
a 10% corporate tax rate, but one has a low standard of living, and uneducated citizens who don’t 
speak English while the other enjoys highly educated, English-speaking citizens and a high 
standard of living. It is likely to conclude that if a firm in each of these countries is acquired by 
an American company, the tax inversion is more likely to take place in the latter country. 
Figure 8 – Likelihood Ratio Test for Capital Structure Significance 
  
 Figure 8 above offers another different conclusion from Specification 1, as the very high 
p-value lets us conclude that there is not a statistically significant relationship between capital 
structure and the likelihood of inversion. This means that when the nominal tax differential is 
taken into account, the target’s capital structure is not significant, despite its statistical 
significance when the observed marginal tax rate differential is taken into account. 
 
 
 
75 
 
IX. Conclusion 
Tax inversion represents a very real and serious threat to the United States economy. For 
decades, regulators have enacted legislation aimed at curbing corporate expatriation, but the 
maneuver is as popular now as it has ever been. NPV analysis proves that motivation exists 
for companies to expatriate both on a run-rate tax differential basis and a locked-out earnings 
basis, and the longer it takes Congress to reduce the corporate income tax rate, the higher the 
net present value of those benefits. 
We observe specific ways in which firms mitigate downside risks to inversion: 
companies that operate in markets without easily-available substitutes tend to pursue 
inversion more frequently, and these firms will use target companies in countries similar to 
the United States from a cultural and capital markets perspective to invert as a means to 
mitigate integration risk. 
Econometric analysis leads us to conclude that run-rate tax differentials, rather than 
whether or not the target resides in a territorial tax system, serves as the key motivation for 
companies to pursue inversions. As a result of this conclusion, we recommend that legislators 
enact a tax holiday, greatly reducing the near-term benefits of corporate inversion. This will 
serve to keep the most successful American companies in the United States while Congress 
works with a new executive branch to reduce the corporate tax rate, a move that would allow 
the American economy to return to its spot as a competitive business environment for the 
most important companies in the world. 
 
 
 
76 
 
X. Appendix 
Table 1 – Total Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  High Low Mean Median Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation 
Target Tax Rate 40.69% 0.00% 25.73% 26.00% 5.81% 22.58% 
Nominal Tax Break 35.00% -5.69% 9.27% 9.00% 5.81% 62.65% 
Potential ETR Differential 23.60% -8.61% 0.72% 0.00% 3.48% 485.43% 
Sales 29,267.38  0.26  1,433.99  291.79  3,636.06  253.56% 
3-Year Sales Growth 24.06% -0.22% 0.29% 0.09% 1.64% 563.81% 
EPS 94.71  (12.49) 0.78  0.17  6.45  823.54% 
Total Assets 52,758.00  10.01  2,188.42  427.38  5,605.24  256.13% 
Market Cap 68,445.32  3.60  1,836.21  333.39  5,976.05  325.45% 
Tobin's Q 4.41  0.02  1.09  0.86  0.81  74.23% 
Enterprise Value/Sales 67.24  0.14  2.63  1.41  5.60  212.92% 
EBITDA Margin 0.89% -9.62% 0.09% 0.13% 0.70% 796.95% 
EBIT Margin 0.67% -9.81% -0.01% 0.08% 0.72% -9755.33% 
Enterprise Value 83,729.82  11.79  2,424.59  388.65  7,719.17  318.37% 
Total Debt 18,851.19  0.00  734.00  37.37  2,383.03  324.67% 
Total Shareholder Equity 28,335.50  (600.00) 767.78  201.51  2,158.25  281.10% 
Debt/Equity Ratio 14.64% -21.45% 0.60% 0.27% 2.52% 420.79% 
Cash 1,890.91  0.00  162.75  39.19  310.16  190.57% 
Target GDP Growth 9.48% -9.13% 1.97% 1.90% 2.26% 114.59% 
Target Unemployment Rate 26.30% 0.03% 5.37% 5.70% 4.08% 76.01% 
USA GDP Growth 2.50% 0.02% 1.70% 2.20% 0.95% 55.62% 
USA Unemployment 9.70% 0.05% 6.13% 7.40% 3.44% 56.14% 
Human Development Index 0.94  0.60  0.87  0.90  0.08  8.83% 
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Table 2 – Tax Inversion Descriptive Statistics 
  High Low Mean Median Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation 
Target Tax Rate 31.00% 12.50% 19.03% 20.00% 6.35% 33.37% 
Nominal Tax Break 22.50% 4.00% 15.97% 15.00% 6.35% 39.76% 
Potential ETR Differential 23.60% -8.61% 10.28% 11.30% 8.89% 86.53% 
Sales 10,307.00  210.35  3,282.97  2,541.00  3,246.20  98.88% 
3-Year Sales Growth 0.54% -0.07% 0.09% 0.01% 0.16% 179.31% 
EPS 3.89  (0.95) 1.73  2.03  1.54  88.63% 
Total Assets 52,758.00  607.62  8,737.19  2,696.59  13,392.61  153.28% 
Market Cap 68,445.32  650.30  11,900.71  3,015.88  19,173.43  161.11% 
Tobin's Q 3.62  0.24  1.31  1.30  0.76  57.61% 
Enterprise Value/Sales 8.47  0.68  3.42  2.89  2.28  66.68% 
EBITDA Margin 0.52% -0.02% 0.24% 0.25% 0.17% 70.93% 
EBIT Margin 0.35% -0.41% 0.11% 0.15% 0.19% 178.86% 
Enterprise Value 83,729.82  705.53  14,563.41  6,516.88  23,742.17  163.03% 
Total Debt 15,531.10  0.00  2,998.20  600.59  4,962.97  165.53% 
Total Shareholder Equity 28,335.50  (600.00) 3,835.49  712.30  6,898.18  179.85% 
Debt/Equity Ratio 6.54% -6.63% 0.66% 0.53% 2.46% 372.43% 
Cash 1,581.00  25.47  434.43  250.00  449.10  103.38% 
Target GDP Growth 5.20% 0.00% 1.67% 1.40% 1.77% 105.63% 
Target Unemployment Rate 14.70% 0.05% 6.42% 6.90% 5.48% 85.35% 
USA GDP Growth 2.50% 0.02% 1.44% 2.20% 1.11% 76.87% 
USA Unemployment 9.70% 0.05% 4.82% 6.20% 3.79% 78.48% 
Human Development Index 0.92  0.88  0.91  0.91  0.01  0.94% 
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Table 3 – Regular Outbound M&A Descriptive Statistics 
  High Low Mean Median Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation 
Target Tax Rate 40.69% 0.00% 26.26% 26.00% 5.46% 20.79% 
Nominal Tax Break 35.00% -5.69% 8.74% 9.00% 5.46% 62.43% 
Sales 29,267.38  0.26  1,287.95  270.52  3,632.21  282.01% 
3-Year Sales Growth 24.06% -0.22% 0.31% 0.09% 1.70% 554.01% 
EPS 94.71  (12.49) 0.72  0.16  6.67  930.38% 
Total Assets 29,482.96  10.01  1,694.91  360.58  4,197.18  247.64% 
Market Cap 13,497.32  3.60  1,031.89  285.66  2,045.29  198.21% 
Tobin's Q 4.41  0.02  1.06  0.84  0.81  76.19% 
Enterprise Value/Sales 67.24  0.14  2.57  1.27  5.77  224.68% 
EBITDA Margin 0.89% -9.62% 0.07% 0.12% 0.72% 988.34% 
EBIT Margin 0.67% -9.81% -0.02% 0.07% 0.75% 4112.71% 
Enterprise Value 32,488.33  11.79  1,468.62  338.23  3,499.49  238.28% 
Total Debt 18,851.19  0.00  567.55  34.04  1,986.88  350.08% 
Total Shareholder Equity 5,722.76  (321.71) 535.12  174.74  937.37  175.17% 
Debt/Equity Ratio 14.64% -21.45% 0.60% 0.25% 2.53% 423.85% 
Cash 1,890.91  0.00  141.57  32.60  288.42  203.73% 
Target GDP Growth 9.48% -9.13% 2.01% 1.90% 2.29% 114.02% 
Target Unemployment Rate 26.30% 0.03% 5.34% 5.65% 3.97% 74.24% 
USA GDP Growth 2.50% 0.02% 1.73% 2.30% 0.93% 53.75% 
USA Unemployment 9.70% 0.05% 6.29% 7.40% 3.40% 54.17% 
Human Development Index 0.94  0.60  0.87  0.90  0.08  9.10% 
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Table 4 – Industry Breakdown 
 
  
% of Total 
Sample 
% of Tax 
Inversions 
% of Regular 
M&A 
MEDTECH 5.7% 23.5% 4.4% 
FERTILIZER 0.4% 5.9% 0.0% 
INDUSTRIAL 9.4% 5.9% 9.7% 
TELECOM 6.1% 5.9% 6.2% 
PHARMA 8.2% 35.3% 6.2% 
ENERGY 7.4% 11.8% 7.0% 
TECH 15.2% 0.0% 16.3% 
PAPER, PACKAGING AND 
FORESTRY 2.5% 0.0% 2.6% 
BIOTECH 2.0% 5.9% 1.8% 
SEMICONDUCTOR 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
TRANSPO 4.1% 0.0% 4.4% 
SERVICES 2.9% 0.0% 3.1% 
ENTERTAINMENT 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
CONSULTING 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
FOOD AND HOSPITALITY 3.7% 5.9% 3.5% 
CHEMICALS 2.0% 0.0% 2.2% 
FINANCE 4.1% 0.0% 4.4% 
INSURANCE 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
AGRICULTURE 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
REAL ESTATE 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
METALS AND MINING 2.9% 0.0% 3.1% 
STORAGE 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
SOFTWARE 4.9% 0.0% 5.3% 
RETAIL 4.9% 0.0% 5.3% 
WATER 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
DISTRIBUTION 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 
AUTO 1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 
HEALTHCARE 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
HR 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
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Table 5 – Country Breakdown 
  
% of Total 
Sample 
% of 
Inversions 
% of 
Traditionals 
AUSTRALIA 7.0% 0.0% 7.5% 
BELGIUM 1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 
BERMUDA 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
BRAZIL 3.3% 0.0% 3.5% 
CANADA 14.3% 17.6% 14.1% 
CHILE 2.0% 0.0% 2.2% 
CHINA 6.6% 0.0% 7.0% 
COLOMBIA 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
DENMARK 1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 
EGYPT 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
ESTONIA 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
FINLAND 1.2% 5.9% 0.9% 
FRANCE 2.9% 0.0% 3.1% 
GERMANY 5.3% 0.0% 5.7% 
GREECE 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 
HONG KONG 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
INDIA 2.5% 0.0% 2.6% 
Indonesia 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
IRELAND 2.9% 41.2% 0.0% 
ISRAEL 4.5% 0.0% 4.8% 
ITALY 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 
JAPAN 4.1% 0.0% 4.4% 
MALAYSIA 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
MEXICO 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
NETHERLANDS 4.1% 11.8% 3.5% 
Norway 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 
POLAND 1.6% 0.0% 1.8% 
RUSSIA 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
SINGAPORE 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 
SOUTH KOREA 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
SPAIN 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
SWEDEN 3.3% 0.0% 3.5% 
SWITZERLAND 0.8% 0.0% 0.9% 
TAIWAN 2.9% 0.0% 3.1% 
Thailand 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
TURKEY 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 17.6% 23.5% 17.2% 
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Table 6 – Inversion Sample Considerations 
  # % 
English-Speaking 15 88.2% 
Worldwide 7 41.2% 
 
Table 7 – Traditional Outbound M&A Sample Considerations 
  # % 
English-Speaking 91 40.1% 
Worldwide 20 8.8% 
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